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PROHIBITIONIST DRUG POLICY IN MEXICO: A
SYSTEMIC CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERMINER*
Francisca Pou Giménez and Catalina Pérez Correa†
Abstract: This article explores and develops a comprehensive set of arguments
demonstrating the unconstitutionality of drug prohibition policies in Mexico. Some
of these arguments have been used to validate recreational and therapeutic uses of
marijuana, while others remain unused and unexplored. There are more than ten
constitutional framings that are useful to evaluate the unconstitutionality of
prohibitionist drug policies. These framings can be grouped into two subcategories:
rights-centered and non-rights centered. Rights-centered framings are grounded on
equality, health, and the free development of the personality. Non-rights-centered
framings include federalism, market regulation and preservation of basic rule of
law guarantees. This paper details resources that may be helpful for judges, policymakers, and civil society organizations interested in a human-rights or
constitutional based approach to drug policy. An in-depth case study of Mexico
reveals useful arguments to evaluate the legal status of drug policy in many other
countries.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, many studies and policy papers have
identified the problems that prohibitionist drug policies generate from the
perspective of human rights and other legally relevant standpoints.1 In an
encouraging turn of events, however, the transnational conversation has
progressively acknowledged the need to pay more attention to countries that
have suffered from prohibitionist drug policies.2
In this paper, we examine why prohibition is unconstitutional and
argue for drug regulation in Mexico. While many of the legal points in this
area are common to a large array of political and social scenarios around the
world, others are dependent on country-specific singularities. Our goal is to
produce a set of analytic and argumentative resources that may be helpful
for judges, policymakers, and civil society organizations that are interested
in approaching drug policy from a constitutional perspective. While some of
these arguments have played a role in the Mexican Supreme Court rulings
on recreational and therapeutic uses of marijuana, many others remain
unexplored. There is now an opportunity for political change, and it is
important to explore this matter holistically, via the Mexican legal system’s
more basic guarantees. An in-depth case study of Mexico provides useful
arguments to evaluate the legal status of drug policies in many other
countries.
In Part I, we address the drug policy and system of legal sources in
Mexico. We first discuss technical questions of hierarchy and distribution of
jurisdiction that help explain how the various applicable legal sources
interact with one another and show that, within the Mexican legal system,
international drug-related treaties are subordinated to the Constitution and to
human rights treaties. We also identify important elements of constitutional
1

See Joanne Csete et al., Public Health and International Drug Policy, 387 THE LANCET 1427
(2016); ORGANIZACIÓN DE ESTADOS AMERICANOS, EL PROBLEMA DE LAS DROGAS EN LAS
AMERICAS [THE DRUG PROBLEM OF THE AMERICAS] (2013), http://www.oas.org/documents/spa/press/Int
roduccion_e_Informe_Analitico.pdf; GLOB. COMM’N ON DRUG POLICY, WAR ON DRUGS: REPORT
OF THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY (2011), https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/repor
ts/the-war-on-drugs; GLOB. COMM’N ON DRUG POLICY, THE WAR ON DRUGS AND HIV/AIDS:
HOW THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DRUG USE FUELS THE GLOBAL PANDEMIC (2012), https://www.globalco
mmissionondrugs.org/reports/the-war-on-drugs-and-hivaids; GLOB. COMM’N ON DRUG POLICY, THE
NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS ON PUBLIC HEALTH: THE HIDDEN HEPATITIS C
EPIDEMIC (2013), https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/GCDP_
HepatitisC_2013_EN.pdf.
2
See Ernesto Zedillo et al., Drug Policy in Mexico: The Cause of a National Tragedy—A Radical but
Indispensable Proposal to Fix It, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 107 (2019).
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interpretation and adjudication in Mexico, and explore different paths of
legal change, including administrative reform, statutory reform, and
judicialization. Lastly, we discuss different goals that may govern those
arguments, such as invalidation, inapplication, or modification of certain
legal sources.
Having shown that the Mexican Constitution poses no formal
obstacles to declare Mexico’s prohibition system unconstitutional, we will
survey the constitutional provisions that determine the substantive
constitutional evaluation of drug policies in Mexico. Some of them are
rights-centered and others are non-rights centered. Non-rights centered
provisions have proved productive in Mexican constitutional litigation in the
past.
Part II discusses rights-centered framings. Among these, three
particularly capture our attention due to their importance. We call them “the
three pillars.” They are health, the free development of personality, and
equality. We emphasize the three pillars because they provide a basis for the
unconstitutionality of the prohibition regime, and also provide guidance for
the Regulation regime that should replace it. Complementary framings
include the rights to life, personal integrity, personal freedom and security,
due process, professional freedom, a healthy environment, as well as the
rights of indigenous communities. These complementary framings are useful
because they allow us to identify the whole gamut of social problems caused
by prohibition, but they are the product of repressive policy itself and would
lose relevance once we move towards Regulation. As of now, however, they
contribute to the demonstration of why and how prohibition violates the
Mexican Constitution.
Part III addresses non-rights framings. With non-rights-centered
framings, we underline the importance of three provisions: (1) market
integrity and state management of the economy, (2) federalism, and (3) the
principle of legality and other standards associated to the preservation of the
rule of law. It is impossible to understand the situation in Mexico without
first recognizing the role prohibitionist policy plays in undermining the
Mexican State’s capacity to fulfill its basic political, legal, and economic
functions. Discussion of these framings helps avoid misconceptions about
the nature and impact of drug cartels in Mexico and distinguishes the cartels
from insurgent groups.
The various framings are important for several reasons. First, each
framing highlights different aspects of the analysis, allowing for different
normative evaluations that influence our perception of the world.3 Second,
3

See Marta Machado & Ana Carolina Bracarense, El movimiento pro y antiaborto en el Supremo
Tribunal Brasileño [The Pro- and Anti-Abortion Movement in the Brazilian Supreme Court], in EL ABORTO
EN AMÉRICA LATINA [ABORTION IN LATIN AMERICA] 111, 136 (2018). As Marta Machado and Ana
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each framing highlights the articulation between legal debates and the social
impact of norms. As the debate on abortion illustrates, some framings are
more ideologically divisive, others receive more consensus, some are
preferred by those most affected, and others are better received by society at
large. Thus, the framing impacts the support and consensus a policy may
command. Third, framing determines the applicable body of law. Some
rights have been strongly developed in international law (e.g., the right to
health), others are more relevant in the comparative constitutional scenes
(e.g., the right to the free development of personality), and still others have
strong local components (e.g., the rights of indigenous communities). Some
have a long tradition in the national legal system and carry over wellestablished precedents, while others do not have an extensive body of
associated judicial doctrine. Most importantly, some framings offer more
protection for individuals and groups than others and set more demanding
standards for the elaboration of drug policy.
Ultimately, we conclude that prohibition is a “constitutional
underminer.” The purpose of these closing remarks is to vividly emphasize
the systemic and self-reinforcing effects of prohibition, measured in terms
of constitutional violations. As demonstrated throughout the paper,
prohibition not only violates several discrete parts of the Constitution, but
also simultaneously attacks the preconditions necessary for the success of
the entire constitutional project. It undermines constitutional normativity in
multiple, mutually reinforcing ways. We close this article by recommending
a systemic “constitutional reinforcer,” that is a drug policy based on market
regulation, harm reduction, and the preservation of health.
I.

DRUG POLICY AND THE SYSTEM OF LEGAL SOURCES IN
MEXICO

To analyze drug regulation in Mexico, we begin by identifying where
regulation is formally contained and the position of these regulations in the
legal system. As we will discuss, prohibition is contained in sources with
sub-constitutional status. Moreover, the constitutional violations perpetrated
by prohibition are not harbored under any explicit restriction contained in
the constitutional text, and further cannot be justified on the basis of a
proportionality analysis. In this section we take up these issues, which have
been consequential in Mexican legal debates.
Drug prohibitions in Mexico are contained in three international
treaties and a series of statutes. The treaties that form the core legal
Carolina Bracarense underline, framings are interpretive schemes that allow individuals to locate, perceive,
identify, and name certain events; framings help to understand patterns of social mobilization and are
important to track how the domain of social movement action and the domain of legal-doctrinal
developments articulate with one another.
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framework of the United Nations’ international drug control regime are the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972
Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances of 1988.4 Together, these sources “provide the
legal structure for an international system of drug control by defining
measures to be maintained within each state party to these conventions.”5
Their core objective is to prevent “the non-scientific and non-medical
production, supply and use or narcotic and psychotropic drugs.” 6 Only
production, distribution, and possession of scheduled drugs for medical or
scientific purposes is permitted.7 The 1971 Convention prohibits the use of
controlled substances listed in Schedule I, except for scientific and limited
medical purposes.8 However, countries are not obliged to make drug use
criminally punishable. According to Amira Armenta and Martin Jelsma,
“[t]he conventions are more restrictive with regard to possession,
acquisition, or growing for personal use.”9 With regard to possession, which
is the conduct most punished by the Mexican state, “a distinction is made
between possession for personal use and possession for trafficking. The
Convention’s emphasis on trafficking may indicate that countries are not
obliged, by virtue of Article 36 of the 1961 Convention, to declare simple
possession a crime.”10
The statutes regulating drugs in Mexico are the General Health Law,
the Federal Criminal Code, the Criminal Codes of the States, and the
National Code of Criminal Procedure. Taken together, these statutes make
any conduct related to illicit drugs—aside from drug use—a crime.
The Federal Criminal Code section on “Crimes Against Health”
provides an inventory of drug-related conduct that is criminally punishable.11
Subsequent articles regulate possession of illicit drugs, a crime punishable
by up to 15 years in prison when carried out in conjunction with any of the
4

See Amira Armenta & Martin Jelsma, The UN Drug Control Conventions—A Primer,
TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.tni.org/en/publication/the-un-drug-controlconventions#6.
5
DAVID BEWLEY-TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL: CONSENSUS FRACTURED 3 (2012) (citing
NEIL BOISTER, PENAL ASPECTS OF THE UN DRUG CONVENTION, 1–4 (2001)).
6
Id.
7
See Armenta & Jelsma, supra note 4.
8
Id.
9
Id. See also United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs art. 33, Mar. 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S.
151 (providing that “The Parties shall not permit the possession of drugs except under legal authority,” and,
in such authorized cases, solely for medical and scientific purposes). Article 36 of the same treaty obliges
the Parties to declare possession a punishable offence. Id. art. 36.
10
See ARMENTA & JELSMA, supra note 4.
11
See Código Penal Federal [CPF] [Federal Criminal Code], Diario oficial de la Federación [DOF] art.
194, 10-1-1994 (Mex.) (including drug production, transport, drug trafficking, commerce, supply,
prescription of ‘narcotics,’ introduction or extraction from the country, contribution, or collaboration of
any sort in financing, supervising, or encouraging the execution of any drug related crime, promotion, and
acts of publicity or propaganda for consumption of any illicit substance.)
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aforementioned conduct. 12 Sanctions may be lower depending on the
quantity of substance possessed. Threshold quantities are established by the
General Health Law, which also lists controlled and illicit substances, and
requisites for obtaining permits for their commerce and distribution.13
In 2009, the General Health Law and the Federal and State criminal
codes were amended to, among other things, distribute drug jurisdiction
between the states and the Federation. A table of “Guidelines for Maximum
Quantities for Personal Use” was included in the General Health Statute
(Article 479), and established threshold amounts for personal use for several
substances. Below this threshold, drug use is not punishable with a prison
sentence, though it is still formally considered a crime. 14 Above this
threshold, provided it does not exceed 1,000 times the personal use amount,
possession of certain drugs is considered small-scale trafficking and falls
within the jurisdiction of the States. When possession of those substances is
1,000 times the established amount, it is considered drug trafficking and falls
under federal jurisdiction.15 Federal jurisdiction also exists when the federal
government initiates an investigation and does not remand it to the state
prosecutor’s office, when the crime is committed under organized crime, and
when the Attorney General’s Office investigates the case or attracts an
ongoing State investigation.16
Finally, the National Code of Criminal Procedure determines which
drug-related offenses merit automatic ex officio pretrial detention (all of
them, except possession for consumption) and what public authorities should
do with secured narcotics.17
These treaty and statutory sources are among a wider universe of legal
sources that include different normative requirements and goals. This wider
universe of sources incorporates progressive elements that demonstrate
prohibition’s unconstitutionality.
A.

Prohibitionist Drug Treaties as Sub-Constitutional Legal
Sources

Prohibition is contained in legal sources that are hierarchically
subordinate to the Mexican Constitution and must be invalidated because
12

Id. art. 195.
See Ley General de Salud [LGS] [General Health Law], DOF art. 237, 19-6-2017; see also LGS, DOF
art. 245, 23-12-1987.
14
See id. art. 479, 20-8-2009.
15
Id. art. 475 20-8-2009.
16
Id. art. 474. See also Catalina Pérez Correa & Karen Silva, Illicit Use of Drugs and Drug Users in
Mexico, in IN SEARCH OF RIGHTS: DRUG USERS AND STATE RESPONSES IN LATIN AMERICA 103
(Coletta Youngers & Catalina Pérez Correa eds., 2014), https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Drug%2
0Policy/In%20Search%20of%20Rights%209july.pdf.
17
See Código Nacional de Procedimientos Penales [CNPP] [National Criminal Procedure Code], DOF
art. 167, 03-05-2014.
13
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they contradict the Constitution itself. To fully understand why this is so, we
discuss how the upper echelons of the system of legal sources are structured
in Mexico.
1.

The 2011 constitutional reform and human rights treaties

On June 10, 2011, a constitutional reform substantially changed the
architecture of Mexican legal sources. The first paragraph of the Mexican
Constitution’s Article 1 now states that the Constitution protects all human
rights included in it, as well as those contained in treaties ratified by
Mexico.18 Therefore, the human rights included in ratified treaties now enjoy
constitutional status. However, the 2011 reform did not alter Article 133
which, mirroring the United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, states
that “[t]his Constitution, the treaties signed in conformity with it, and
statutes, are the Supreme Law of the Land.”19
The Mexican Supreme Court interpreted the new constitutional
provisions in a series of rulings issued between 2011 and 2015.20 The Court
emphasized that only treaties containing human rights norms enjoy
constitutional status. 21 Other treaties, including drug treaties, remain
governed by Article 133.22 According to consolidated precedent, treaties are

18

Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CPEUM], art. 1, ¶ 1, DOF 05-02-1917,
últimas reformas DOF 17-05-2021, states that “[i]n the United Mexican States all persons will enjoy the
human rights recognized in this Constitution and in the international treaties of which the Mexican State is
party, as well as the guarantees for their protection, whose exercise cannot be restricted nor suspended,
except in the cases and under the conditions set forth in this Constitution” [authors’ translation]. According
to the constitutional wording, provisions that clearly contain a human right enter the Mexican Constitutional
block, even if included in treaties that are not formal human rights treaties.
19
Id. art. 133; U.S. CONST., art. VI.
20
See Caso Rosendo Radilla Pacheco [Case of Rosendo Radilla Pacheco], Pleno de la Suprema Corte de
Justicia de la Nación [SCJN], Julio de 2011, Varios 912/2010 (holding that international and constitutional
rights sources enjoy the same hierarchical status but that conflicts among them must be solved by
prioritizing the provision most favorable to the individual); Trabajo a favor de la comunidad [Work in
favor of the community], Pleno de la SCJN, Febrero de 2012, Acción de inconstitucionalidad [Action of
Unconstitutionality] 155/2007 (declaring the prevalence in the case of the most favorable international
human rights source); id., Septiembre de 2013, Contradicción de tesis [Thesis Contradiction] 293/2011
(holding that international and constitutional human rights sources enjoy the same hierarchical status but
that conflicts among them must be solved by attending explicit constitutional rights restrictions); Procede
el recurso de revisión en amparo directo, cuando se alegue que una norma secundaria es contraria a una de
derechos humanos contenida en un tratado internacional [The Appeal for Revision in Direct Amparo
Proceeds, when it is Alleged that a Secondary Norm is Contrary to one of Human Rights Contained in an
International Treaty], Pleno de la SCJN, 5 septiembre, 2013, Contradicción de tesis 21/2011 (explaining
the new understanding of constitutionality and legality conflicts within the new system of legal sources).
See also Francisca Pou Giménez & Alejandro Rodiles, Mexico, in DUELING FOR SUPREMACY:
INTERNATIONAL LAW VS. NATIONAL FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES (Fulvio Palombino ed., 2019).
21
Pleno de la SCJN, 5 septiembre, 2013, Contradicción de tesis 293/2011; Pleno de la SCJN, 9
septiembre, 2013, Contradicción de tesis 21/2011.
22
See CPEUM, art. 133, DOF 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 17-05-2021.
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situated above ordinary statutes and below the Constitution, in an
intermediate echelon.23
This line of jurisprudence explains that non-human rights treaties
inhabit an intermediate echelon alongside General Statutes, which are
federal statutes that distribute jurisdiction between the Federation, states, and
municipalities. Examples of General Statutes include the General Health
Law, the General Education Law, and the General Law of Transparency and
Access to Governmental Information. General Statutes also provide broad
parameters of regulation that must be respected by all levels of government.
These parameters are part of the Mexican “block of constitutionality,” since
the Constitution directs them to establish or regulate issues and questions
that the Constitution could determine by itself.24
Supreme Court precedent makes clear that General Statutes are
hierarchically superior to ordinary federal and state statutes because they set

23

See Tratados internacionales. Son parte integrante de la ley suprema de la unión y se ubican
jerárquicamente por encima de las leyes generales, federales y locales. Interpretación del artículo 133
constitucional [International Treaties. They are an integral part of the Supreme Law of the Union, and are
located hierarchically above General, Federal, and Local Laws. Interpretation of Article 133 of the
Constitution.], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta [SJFG] [Federal Judicial Weekly Report
and its Gazette], Novena Época Tomo XXV, Abril de 2007, Tesis P IX/2007, 6. (“The systematic
interpretation of Article 133 of the Constitution allows for the identification of a superior legal order, of
national character, integrated by the Federal Constitution, international treaties and general statutes.
Additionally, from this interpretation, harmonized with the principles of international law spread all along
the constitution and with the norms and fundamental premises of that branch of the law, one may conclude
that international treaties are hierarchically below the Federal Constitution and above general, federal and
state statutes, to the extent the Mexican State in subscribing to them (…) and in view of the fundamental
principle of consuetudinary international law of pacta sunt servanda, freely assume obligations before the
international community that cannot be disregarded invoking norms of internal law, and whose
inobservance implies, moreover, a responsibility of an international kind” [authors’ translation].) See
generally GABRIELA RODRÍGUEZ HUERTA, LA INCORPORACIÓN Y APLICACIÓN DEL DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL EN EL ORDEN JURÍDICO MEXICANO 92–102 (2015).
24
See Manuel Góngora-Mera, The Block of Constitutionality as the Doctrinal Pivot of a Ius Commune,
in TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW IUS COMMUNE
235 (2017). The notion of “block of constitutionality” emerged in France to account for the constitutional
position enjoyed by the Preamble of the 1958 Constitution and by the 1989 Declaration of Rights. In Spain,
the same language is used to describe the way the Constitution delegates on the Autonomy Statutes the
delimitation of the areas of jurisdiction enjoyed by Autonomous Communities. Therefore, the Statutes
become, functionally, part of the Constitution.
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jurisdictional boundaries .25 Thus, General statutes are part of the “superior
legal order,” to which all other legal orders in Mexico are subordinated.26
2.

The hierarchy of non-human rights treaties and general
statutes

It is unclear, however, how General Statutes and non-human rights
treaties interact with one another. Prior to the 2011 Amendments, the Court
opined that non-human rights treaties were ranked above the General
Statutes and ordinary federal and state statutes.27 However, after the reforms,
one may argue that conflicts between norms situated at the immediate subconstitutional level must be handled according to the general criteria of
conflict resolution for provisions of the same rank. These criteria state, for
instance, that the most recent norm (lex posterior) or the most specific (lex
specialis) must prevail.28 In Mexico, these criteria include the “pro persona
principle,” found in the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Constitution,
which directs the interpreter to choose, in a clash of equal norms, the
provision that is most beneficial to individuals.29
25

See Leyes generales. Interpretación del artículo 133 constitucional. [General Statutes. Interpretation of
Article 133 of the constitution.] Pleno de la SCJN, SJFG, Novena Época, Tomo XXV, Abril de 2007, Tesis
P. VII/2007, página 5. The reading of this article reveals that the constituent power wanted to establish a
series of provisions of general observance which, to the extent they are in accordance with the provisions
of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, are the “the Supreme Law of the Union.” In this
regard, it must be understood that the statutes of Congress to which that constitutional article refers are not
federal statutes, but general statutes, which are those that may validly have an effect on all the partial legal
orders that integrate the Mexican State. General statutes are those with respect to which the Constituent or
the Amending Power has explicitly renounced its powers to distribute attributions to the political entities
that pertain to the Mexican State, something that translates into an exception to the principle set down in
Article 124 of the Constitution. Moreover, these statutes are not issued motu proprio by the Congress of
the Union but find origin in constitutional clauses. Once promulgated and published, these statutes will
have to be enforced by federal, local, Mexico City and municipal authorities” [authors’ translation].
26
Id. (“Departing from the interpretation of the aforementioned provision [article 133], if we accept that
the statutes of Congress to which it refers are not federal statutes, but those statutes that have an effect on
all partial legal orders integrating the Mexican State and whose issuance derives from constitutional clauses
that oblige the Legislature to issue them, the principle of ‘constitutional supremacy’ implicit in the text of
the article under analysis clearly translates itself into the General Constitution of the Republic, general
statues of the Congress of the Union, and the international treaties in accordance with it constituting the
‘Supreme Law of the Union,’ that is, conforming a superior legal order, of an national character, in whose
context the Constitution is placed at the top, and below it international treaties and general statutes”
[authors’ translation] (emphasis added).
27
See SJFG, Tesis P IX/2007, supra note 23.
28
See Voto concurrente que formula el Magistrado Fernando Rangel Ramírez respecto de la ejecutoria
por la que se resolvió la contradicción de tesis 9/2019 [Concurring opinion of Judge Fernando Rangel
Ramírez regarding the resolution of Thesis Contradiction 9/2019], Semanario Judicial de la Federación
[SJF], Décima Época, Enero de 2020, Tesis PC.I.C. J/101 C (citing three principles for resolving conflicts
between norms), https://sjf.scjn.gob.mx/SJFSem/Paginas/DetalleGeneralScroll.aspx?id=43535&Clase=V
otosDetalleBL.
29
See CPEUM, art. 1 ¶ 2, DOF 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 17-05-2021 (“The provisions relating
to human rights shall be interpreted according to this Constitution and the international treaties on the
subject, working in favor of the broader protection of people at all times.” The Mexican Supreme Court
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To understand the structure of legal sources at the highest level in
Mexico, “explicit constitutional restrictions” must also be mentioned. This
phrase was coined by the Supreme Court in Contradicción de Tesis 293/2011
when grappling with constitutional provisions that contradict human rights
treaty provisions, such as conflicts among sources that both enjoy
constitutional status. 30 For instance, the provision restricting the right of
indicted individuals to vote in Article 38.II is incompatible with the
regulation of voting rights in Article 23.II of the American Convention of
Human Rights, and with the right to the presumption of innocence in Article
20 of the Constitution.31 To deal with these conflicts, the Court held in a
leading case, Contradicción de Tesis 293/2011, that an explicit constitutional
restriction prevails over conflicting human rights treaty provisions. 32 The
majority opinion did not specify what constitutes an “explicit constitutional
restriction.” However, in separate concurrences, several Justices stated that
restrictions must be interpreted narrowly, so as to provide rights with the
maximum possible scope.33 The implied understanding of the case is that
these “explicit constitutional restrictions” are to be identified with the
constitutional provisions that directly collide with treaty provisions.34

defines it as a “hermeneutical criterion that informs the whole international law of human rights, and
according to which the widest norm or the most extensive interpretation has to be applied,” furthermore
clarifying that norms related to human rights shall be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution and
with international treaties to which Mexico is a party, in a way that broadly favors persons [authors’
translation]). See also Principio pro personae. El contenido y alcance de los derechos humanos deben
analizarse a partir de aquél. [Pro personae principle. The content and scope of human rights must be
analyzed on the basis of this principle.] Pleno de la SCJN, SJFG, Décima Época, Libro V, Febrero de 2012,
Tomo 1, Tesis XXVI/2012, 659.
30
See CPEUM, DOF 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 17-05-2021.
31
Id. See American Convention on Human Rights art. 38 ¶ 2, Nov. 22, 1969; see also American
Convention on Human Rights, art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969. The provisions in article 38, section II, of the
Constitution prescribe the withdrawal of all political rights to individuals condemned or simply under trial,
in contravention of the presumption of innocence protected in Article 20 of the Constitution itself, and with
Article 23 American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR), which allows for the regulation —not the
withdrawal—of the voting rights of convicted individuals (not of those that have been merely indicted).
32
Contradicción de tesis 293/2011, supra note 2120.
33
Five of nine Justices voted in favor of the new criteria (Ortiz, Zaldívar, Franco, Silva, and Sánchez
Cordero), arguing in favor of carefully examining in each particular case the reach of explicit constitutional
restrictions.
34
See Derechos humanos contenidos en la constitución y en los tratados internacionales. Constituyen el
parámetro de control de regularidad constitucional, pero cuando en la constitución haya una restricción
expresa al ejercicio de aquéllos, se debe estar a lo que establece el texto constitucional. [Human Rights
contained in the Constitution and in International Treaties. They constitute the parameter for constitutional
regularity control, but when the Constitution contains an express restriction on their exercise, the
constitutional text must prevail.] Pleno de la SCJN, SJFG, Décima Época, Libro 5 Abril de 2014, Tomo I,
Tesis P./J. 20/2014, 202; see also amparo directo en revision, Pleno de la SCJN, 14 abril, 2015, 1250/2012
(on judicially unsupervised pretrial long-term home arrest or arraigo); acción de inconstitucionalidad,
Pleno de la SCJN, 9 enero, 2014, 32/2012 (on geo-localization of individuals); Pleno de la SCJN, 11 mayo,
2015, Varios 1396/2011 (on implementation of the Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. Rosendo Cantú and Fernández
Ortega rulings).
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How can we understand prohibitionist drug treaties and statutes within
this framework? Since drug treaties are not human rights treaties,35 they are
inferior to the Constitution and to human rights treaties. However, they are
also superior to criminal statues, occupying the same intermediate echelon
as drug-related provisions in the General Health Law (a General Statue).
prohibition is then contained in statutory and supra-statutory norms—that is
to say, infra-constitutional norms—which must always respect constitutional
provisions.
B.

Prohibition and International Human Rights Law

As we will see in the following sections, the prohibition regime
contained in drug treaties, the General Health Law, and the Criminal Codes,
impinges on a number of constitutional and treaty rights and other
constitutional provisions. Some isolated aspects of the regime might be
considered to be covered by constitutional provisions, such as those that
habilitate mandatory pretrial detention for drug crimes and could also be
considered to be a “explicit constitutional restriction.” 36 However, that is not
the case with the bulk of the prohibitionist regulatory regime that restricts
rights. As will become increasingly evident throughout this article,
prohibition not only violates important rights provisions, but also violates
constitutional provisions concerning market regulation, federalism, the
division of powers, and the State’s responsibility to function in harmony with
the rule of law.
Contradictions between prohibition and human rights are frequently
observed by international human rights authorities. The United Nations has
35
See SCJN, Reformas Constitucionales en materia de Amparo y Derechos Humanos publicadas en junio
de 2011, DOF 28-05-2021, formato HTML, http://www.internet2.scjn.gob.mx/red/constitucion/. In the
“Normativity” section of the Supreme Court website, under the heading ‘International treaties to which
Mexico is party where human rights are recognized,’ three treaties are identified as human rights treaties in
the domain of health, including the OMS Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, but no drug treaties
are listed. See also SCJN determina que las normas sobre derechos humanos contenidas en Tratados
Internacionales tienen rango constitucional [SCJN determines that the norms regarding human rights within
international treaties have constitutional range], SCJN, Seguimiento de Asuntos Resueltos por el Pleno de
la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [Follow-up to Related Resolved Affairs by the Plenum of the
SCJN], Contradicción de tesis 293/2011; Procede el recurso de revisión en amparo directo, cuando se
alegue que una norma secundaria es contraria a una de derechos humanos contenida en un tratado
internacional, SCJN, Seguimiento de Asuntos Resueltos por el Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la
Nación [Follow-up to Related Resolved Affairs by the Plenum of the SCJN], Contradicción de tesis
21/2011-PL.
36
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7.3, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 (stating that nobody may be subject to arbitrary detention or incarceration, noting that the InterAmerican Court has said that preventive incarceration is arbitrary when not being carefully justified by
public authorities in view of the specific needs and characteristics of the situation, under standards that
include necessity and proportionality, not being possible to ground it simply on the imputation of a
particular kind of criminal offense.) See López Álvarez v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 141 ¶¶ 66–69, 81; Norín Catrimán et al. (Leaders, Members, and
Activist of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 279 ¶ 311.
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emphasized that drug policies must be implemented in conformity with the
Charter of the UN, with full respect for all human rights and that, in cases of
conflict, human rights obligations must prevail:
“A number of United Nations bodies enforce the three
drug control treaties and are required to promote and protect
human rights, as identified in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter of
the United Nations. When the goals and approaches of the
international drug control regime and international human rights
regime conflict, it is clear that human rights obligations should
prevail. The General Assembly has consistently adopted
resolutions declaring that international drug control must be
carried out in conformity with the Charter, and ‘with full respect
for human rights’ (see resolutions 62/176 and 63/197).” 37
The Supreme Court of Mexico has already declared the prohibition of
recreational and therapeutic possession and use of cannabis
unconstitutional. 38 Additionally, a District Judge recently declared the
prohibition of possession and personal use of cocaine unconstitutional.39
The arguments behind these rulings rely on the idea that rights have
been infringed and show that infringement cannot be justified by a
proportionality analysis. Because most constitutional rights are understood
as principles, not absolute rules, contemporary rights reasoning is always a
two-step process. First, a limitation on a right must be shown to exist.
Second, whether this limitation is justified must be ascertained by applying
the four-prong inquiry known as proportionality analysis. We start by
explaining how a proportionality analysis functions in constitutional drug
policy arguments. We will also mention other principles of interpretation and
enforcement of rights that play a role in our later arguments.
C.

Rules on Interpretation, Enforcement, and Limitation of Rights

Due to the 2011 amendments, the Mexican Constitution now includes
a capacious toolkit that “unpacks” and maximizes the scope of rights,
facilitating their enforcement. Article 1 declares that all human rights-related
provisions shall be interpreted according to the Constitution and treaties on
37

See G.A. Res. 51/12, ¶ 10 (Aug. 6, 2010).
See Primera Sala de la SCJN [First Chamber of the SCJN] 04-11-2015, amparo en revisión 237/2014;
Primera Sala de la SCJN 11-04-2018, amparo en revisión 1115/2017; Primera Sala de la SCJN 13-06-2018,
amparo en revisión 623/2017; Segunda Sala de la SCJN [Second Chamber of the SCJN] 04-07-2018,
amparo en revisión 1163/2017 concerning recreational use); see Segunda Sala de la SCJN 14-08-2019,
amparo en revisión 57/2019 (on therapeutic use, which was previously decriminalized, but left largely
unregulated by the legislature in 2017).
39
Sentencia [Sentencing], Juzgado Décimo Cuarto de Distrito en Materia Administrativa [Fourteenth
District Court on Administrative Matters] 31-05-2019, amparo indirecto 252/2019.
38
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the subject, favoring the broad protection of the individual. Article 1 further
states that all public authorities must promote, respect, protect, and guarantee
human rights according to the principles of universality, interdependence,
indivisibility, and progressivity. It provides that public authorities must
prevent, investigate, sanction, and repair human rights violations as provided
for by law.40
These principles and duties may be used to support an argument for
changing current drug policies based on prohibition. Considering the post2011 Constitution and the significant evidence regarding the negative effects
of prohibition, Mexican public authorities are both constitutionally obligated
to address and ameliorate the situation. They are also obligated to adopt drug
policies that promote, respect, protect, and fulfill human rights to prevent
repeat violations.
One of the relevant principles to consider is proportionality, which is
considered intrinsic to the operation of rights as normative provisions.
Contemporary rights clauses usually take the structure of principles, not
rules.41 This means that they are not absolute and that arguments that frame
certain regulations, acts, or events, as a violation of rights, are not inherently
conclusive. In contrast with rule-like rights, which are categorical, principlelike rights may be limited under certain conditions. Contemporary courts
around the world evaluate whether these conditions are met by applying the
proportionality test, a test used to evaluate when rights limitations can be
justified and when they cannot. 42 The Mexican Supreme Court is no
exception, and has used proportionality analyses in important rights cases,
including those dealing with the consumption of cannabis.43
Public authorities must meet a four-step test under the proportionality
analysis to preserve a government measure that prima facie violates rights.44
First, the measure must pursue a legitimate objective, one that is admissible
40

CPEUM, art. 1 ¶ 2, DOF 05-02-1917; “The provisions relating to human rights shall be interpreted
according to this Constitution and the international treaties on the subject, working in favor of the broader
protection of people at all times / All authorities, in their areas of competence, are obliged to promote,
respect, protect and guarantee Human Rights, in accordance with the principles of universality,
interdependence, indivisibility and progressiveness. Consequently, the State must prevent, investigate,
penalize, and rectify violations to Human Rights, according to the law.”
41
An example of right that (exceptionally) displays structure of non-defeasible rule, not principle, would
be the prohibition of torture, or the rule of non-refoulement.
42
See KAI MÖLLER, THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2012) for discussion on the
global use of proportionality; see also ALEC STONE SWEET & JUD MATHEWS, PROPORTIONALITY
BALANCING AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE AND GLOBAL APPROACH (2019); Alec
Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 72 (2008).
43
Arturo Bárcena Zubieta, Proportionality and Human Rights in Mexico, in PROPORTIONALITY AND
TRANSFORMATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM LATIN AMERICA (Francisca Pou Giménez et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2022) (exploring the use of proportionality analysis by the Mexican Supreme Court).
44
See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2002); AHARON BARAK,
PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATION (2012); MATTHIAS KLATT &
MORITZ MEISTER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF PROPORTIONALITY (2012); CARLOS BERNAL
PULIDO, EL PRINCIPIO DE PROPORCIONALIDAD Y LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (3rd ed. 2007).
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under the Constitution and coherent with its normative program.45 Second,
the measure must be a suitable means to achieve that goal; that is, it is
instrumentally apt to achieve that goal.46 Third, it must be necessary.47 There
are no alternative means that allow for the achievement of the goal, with a
lesser impairment on rights. Fourth, the measure must be proportional in the
narrow sense.48
It is important to be familiar with the mechanics of proportionality
because public authorities typically justify prohibitionist drug policies on
this basis. They argue that, even if prohibition negatively impacts
constitutional rights, it protects legitimate objectives, and represents a
suitable, necessary, and proportional means to achieve those objectives, thus
justifying rights limitations. The rights-based arguments on drug policy
developed in the next section must be read in this light. These arguments
both identify the impingement of rights and provide grounds and elements
that show prohibition does not satisfy the requirements of proportionality
analysis and cannot be therefore considered justified rights limitations.
Prohibition clearly does not satisfy the requirements of proportionality
analysis. In some instances, the goals said to justify prohibition are not
constitutionally legitimate, as they are based on perfectionistic models of
personal virtue that clash with constitutional rights. Other times, when health
or national and public security interests are brought forward, these goals
point to problems that have in part been generated by the prohibitionist
policy itself. The only goals that seem to be legitimate goals in the context
of the legal treatment of drug use are the concern for the health of people
who use drugs, the health of minors, or of third parties. However, as we will
corroborate in Part II, the problem is that prohibitionist measures are not
suitable to protect these goals. They are unnecessary because there are far
better alternatives to protect those goals. And they are disproportionate in
the narrow sense, since there is an imbalance between what is gained through
prohibition and the costs (in terms of rights violations and other
constitutional infringements) its enforcement generates. As we will later
outline, prohibition has proven to not only represent serious violations of
rights but also threatens the foundations of the constitutional system.
Prohibition is not a reasonable and proportional limitation of rights,
no matter the constitutional rights framing applied. Because of the scope of
the damage caused by prohibition, there will always be a problem of
“disproportionality in the narrow sense.” A balance between the consequent
gains and losses will never obtained.
45

See ALEXY, supra note 44.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. These are the steps identified, with slight variations, in the global literature on proportionality and
in standard constitutional court’s practice. See MÖLLER, supra note 42. The fourth prong of the analysis is
called “proportionality in the narrow sense,” “balancing,” or “ponderation.”
46

72

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

D.

VOL. 31 NO. 1

How to Eliminate Prohibitionist Treaties and Statutes

It is necessary to next consider how to nullify the normative force of
prohibitionist treaties and statutes. Treaties can be internationally
denounced, and statutes may be repealed or modified by the Executive and
the Legislature. However, when these straightforward channels are
unavailable, other options are worth considering. We explore three: (1)
judicial invalidation, (2) judicial inapplication, and (3) judicial nonselection. Although we investigate these possibilities, we still find that it is
optimal for Congress to regulate drug markets. There are many reasons why
Congress, not the courts, should take up this responsibility, although the
development of these reasons is beyond the scope of this article.49
1.

Invalidation

In Mexico, treaties may be subjected to abstract review if a legitimate
party files an acción de inconstitucionalidad [action of
unconstitutionality]. 50 This specific channel of review is shaped after the
Kelsenian model of abstract statutory review 51 and may be filed only by
certain authorities and institutions, against a collection of general norms or
regulations. All kinds of constitutional violations may be denounced through
this review. If the Court concludes that the provisions under review are
unconstitutional by a qualified majority of eight out of eleven Justices, they
will be expelled from the legal system and erased from the books.52
An action of unconstitutionality can only be filed within thirty days
following the publication of the general norms in the Diario Oficial.53 This
renders impossible the nullification of treaties that were signed and ratified
49

For general arguments about the role of courts and parliaments in a democracy see Roberto Gargarella,
Un papel renovado para la Corte Suprema: Democracia e interpretación judicial de la Constitución [A
Renewed Role for the Supreme Court: Democracy and Judicial Interpretation of the Constitution], in
TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES Y CONSOLIDACIÓN DE LA DEMOCRACIA [Constitutional Courts and
Consolidation of Democracy] 231 (2007).
50
CPEUM, art. 105, DOF 05-02-1917.
51
At the beginnings of the twentieth century, Hans Kelsen devised a system of judicial review of
legislation that was very different—in a sense, opposed—to the one that had developed in the nineteenth
century in the United States and Latin America. In his model, frequently called the “European model of
judicial review,” judicial review is concentrated in only one, specialized organ, formed by members
selected by special appointment procedures, who examine the validity of the law in the abstract (not in the
course of resolving a specific controversy), at the instance of a limited set of institutional actors. If the
statue is found to be invalid, it is expelled from the legal system—i.e., the declaration of invalidity has
general effects, not only effects for the parties, as occurs in decentralized, incidental, inter-pars American
systems. See VÍCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES: A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (2009).
52
Ley Reglamentaria de las Fracciones I y II del Artículo 105 de la Constitución Política de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos [Regulatory Law of Fractions I and II of Article 105 of the Political Constitution of the
United Mexican States], arts. 59–73.
53
Id. art. 60.
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long ago. However, the Court has indicated that general norms can be
challenged if they are modified; so, it is possible to challenge treaties if they
are later altered.
The General Health Law, as well as the federal and criminal codes,
may be also subject to abstract review through the same procedural channel.
But again, only amendments to existing provisions would formally open the
possibility of challenge before the Court.
2.

Inapplication

The General Health Law, criminal codes, and drug treaties may be set
aside, as any other norm or act of public authority, in an amparo [writ of
amparo].54 An amparo is a constitutional complaint that may be filed before
federal judges by individuals, corporations, groups, or organizations, in
defense of their constitutional rights. The writ of amparo is a channel of
semi-decentralized, incidental review that, when filed against general norms,
leads only to their inapplication in the case at hand. If, however, a normative
provision is found unconstitutional and unapplied for five consecutive times,
then the decision becomes binding precedent and judges are obligated to
abstain from applying the norm whenever someone requests to do so by
filing an amparo, which is an extraordinary constitutional appeal. 55 An
amparo is often referred to as a “constitutional protection lawsuit.” 56
However, executive authorities may continue to apply the law as written and
only people who file an amparo will benefit from the existence of a judicial
precedent.
Once a binding precedent is established concerning a statutory or
administrative regulation, the Supreme Court may hold a special vote to
decide, by a qualified majority, whether those provisions must be definitely
removed, erga omnes,57 from the legal system.58

54

CPEUM, arts. 103, 107, DOF 05-02-1917.
A recent constitutional and legal reform changed this requirement. One ruling of the Supreme Court,
not five, is now sufficient to establish a binding precedent if supported by four votes in the Chambers and
eight votes in the Plenary. Ley de Amparo, Reglamentaria de los Artículos 103 y 107 de la Constitución
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [LARACPEUM] [Amparo Law, Regulating Articles 103 and
107 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States], arts. 215, 222, 223, últimas reformas DOF
07-06-2021 [hereinafter Amparo Act]. We still refer to the earlier rule (five consecutive rulings) because it
is the one that applied to the mentioned cannabis cases. The five-ruling system continues to apply for
precedents of the Collegiate Courts to be binding on lower courts. Amparo Act, art. 224.
56
Mexico: New Amparo Law is Enacted, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr. 30, 2013),
https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2013-04-30/mexico-new-amparo-law-is-enacted/.
57
Id. Removal, erga omnes, refers to the derogation of a provision for everyone, not just for people who
file a writ of amparo.
58
See id. arts. 107-II, 231, 232.
55

74

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 1

In regard to cannabis, the Supreme Court has upheld five consecutive
rulings stating that a blanket prohibition of cannabis use is unconstitutional.59
This makes the decision a binding criterion for all lower tribunals.60 The
Court gave Congress until October 30, 2019, to approve laws permitting the
use of cannabis. However, one day before that date, the Senate petitioned the
Court for an extension.61 The Court accepted the petition as “an exceptional
measure” and “on one single occasion,” and gave Congress until April 30,
2020, to pass the corresponding legislation. 62 In June 2021, the Supreme
Court held a special vote and decided by a majority of eight Justices to expel
the articles that prohibited people from obtaining permits to plant, grow,
possess and use cannabis for personal use, from the Mexican legal system.63
The Court’s ruling only applies to people who petition a permit but not to
people who grow, transport or use, without a permit.64
3.

Non-selection

The new architecture of legal sources in Mexico could provide a way
to set aside prohibitionist infra-constitutional treaties by considering other
sources to be prevalent in determining the law. This may be an interesting
possibility for the Mexican Congress to derogate or modify prohibition
without denouncing international drug treaties. The legal reasoning here is
complex—it is only roughly outlined in this text—and requires that we recall

59

Comunicados de Prensa [Press Release], SCJN, Reitera Primera Sala inconstitucionalidad de la
prohibición absoluta del consumo recreativo de marihuana e integra jurisprudencia [First Chamber
reiterates unconstitutionality of the absolute prohibition of the recreational use of marijuana and
integrates jurisprudence], No. 140/2018, 31-10-2018, http://www.internet2.scjn.gob.mx/red2/
comunicados/noticia.asp?id=5785. The five decisions are: Primera Sala de la SCJN, 04-11-2015,
amparo en revisión 237/2014; id. 13-06-2018, amparo en revisión 623/2017; id. 11-04-2018, amparo en
revisión 1115/2017; id. Primera Sala de la SCJN, 31-10-2018, amparo en revisión 547/201; id. 31-10-2018,
amparo en revisión 548/2018. See also Segunda Sala de la SCJN, 04-07-2018, amparo en revisión
1163/2017, http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/TematicaPub.aspx.
60
CPEUM, art. 10, DOF 05-02-1917.
61
Solicita Senado prórroga a SCJN para legislar regulación integral del cannabis [Senate Requests
Extension to the SCJN to Legislate Comprehensive Regulation of Cannabis], SENADO DE LA
REPÚBLICA, COORDINACIÓN DE COMUNICACIÓN SOCIAL (Oct. 29, 2019, 8:19 PM),
http://comunicacion.senado.gob.mx/index.php/informacion/boletines/46624-solicita-senadoprorroga-a-scjn-para-legislar-regulacion-integral-de-la-cannabis.html.
62
Otorga Suprema Corte al Senado prórroga para legislar sobre cannabis [Supreme Court Grants
Senate Extension for Cannabis Legislation], SENADO DE LA REPÚBLICA COORDINACIÓN DE
COMUNICACIÓN SOCIAL (Nov. 5, 2019, 3:28 PM), http://comunicacion.senado.gob.mx/index.php/
informacion/boletines/46675-otorga-suprema-corte-al-senado-prorroga-para-legislar-sobrecannabis.html.
63
Comunicados de Prensa [Press Release], SCJN, SCJN invalida, con efectos generales, la prohibición
absoluta contenida en la ley general de salud para realizar actividades relacionadas con el autoconsumo
lúdico o recreativo de cannabis y THC [The Supreme Court Invalidates, with General Effects, the Absolute
Prohibition Contained in the General Health Law of Activities Associated to the Recreational or Ludic SelfConsumption of Cannabis and THC], No. 187/2021, 28-06-2021,
https://www.internet2.scjn.gob.mx/red2/comunicados/noticia.asp?id=6495.
64
Id.
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what the Supreme Court has affirmed regarding the selection of applicable
norms when assessing limitations to human rights.
In landmark rulings, the Supreme Court has stated that constitutional
and treaty sources dealing with human rights must be treated as a functional
unit, in their “material interrelation,” in order to fulfill the constitutional
mandate of finding the greatest benefit for the individual.65 When an explicit
constitutional restriction is absent, and specific grounds that apply other
criteria of normative conflict resolution are also absent, the Court directs the
interpreter to holistically approach the Bill of Rights, selecting the norm that
is most beneficial to the people. Of course, there will always be a substantive
argument available, about which norm or body of law is “most beneficial to
the person.” But as the following sections suggest, showing that prohibition
legal sources are not the most beneficial to individuals and society as a
whole—as compared to a reasonable scheme of regulation—is not difficult.
One may argue that the interaction between sources of law in the
intermediate echelon (i.e., interaction between drug treaties and the General
Health Law) must be managed by selecting the norm that is most beneficial
to the person. The unselected norm would not be declared invalid nor
expelled from the legal system but would lose precedence in its application
(before a hypothetically amended, rights-promoting General Health Law).
While this might create a problem of international responsibility, it would be
a viable option under the constitutional system.
A recent ruling on abortion confirms that the Supreme Court now
considers normative interactions with increasing sophistication. 66 This
approach might be applied in the domain of drug policy if there is an interest
in modifying or replacing prohibition with a human rights-based drug policy,
while maintaining drug treaties. In this abortion ruling, a pregnant woman
experiencing severe health problems and risks was denied medical
assistance. The Supreme Court declared that denying medical attention when
such attention is immediately necessary, is a violation of the individual’s
right to health and a violation of the medical personnel’s duties under the
General Health Law. The court concluded that this was true irrespective of
whether adequate medical attention requires termination of the pregnancy

65

Pleno de la SCJN, 03-09-2013, Contradicción de tesis 293/2011, 29–31, 35–37, 47–54; id. 09-09-2013,
Contradicción de tesis 21/2011, 54–74 (Paragraph 59 states that “the first paragraph of Article 1 of the
constitution gave rise to a material interrelation between the norms in the constitution and those in the
international treaties ratified by Mexico to the purpose of fixing the content of a human right, the hierarchy
of its source in the legal system not being relevant.” Paragraph 68 states that “the content of the respective
human will therefore only one and will be conformed on the basis of the constitutional and international
treaty norm or norms which, in principle, allow a greater degree of free development of personal freedom
and autonomy, on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Constitution, this not implying the
disregard of the explicit constitutional restrictions to the exercise of rights set down in the constitutional
text”).
66
Primera Sala de la SCJN, 15-05-2019, amparo en revisión 1388/2015.
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(under consent of the petitioner).67 This rule is important because applicable
criminal provisions do not allow the interruption of pregnancies on health
grounds.68 The ruling reveals a careful handling of the interaction of different
sources of law. The federal criminal code decriminalizes abortion only in
situations of negligence, risk to life (not health), and rape,69 but the Court
grounded its decision within different, concurrently applicable sources of
law.70 And while it is true that the General Health Law is not the same as an
ordinary criminal statute, the Court’s argument was not based on hierarchy.
Rather, it reflected an effort to apply valid norms, dictated within different
areas of jurisdiction, with partially overlapping domains of application. The
Court crucially demonstrated, in this case, that criminal code provisions do
not preclude the application of health law provisions. This logic may be
transferred to the issue at hand, prohibition.
II.

THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROHIBITION: RIGHTS
FRAMINGS

We now examine why a policy that maintains an immense illegal
transnational market on drugs undermines core normative commitments of
the constitutional system. This section includes both normative arguments
and empirical data which demonstrate how prohibition damages
constitutional rights.
We concentrate on three rights-related framings that have been most
affected by prohibition: (1) the right to health, (2) the right to the free
development of one’s personality, and (3) the right to equality. The
arguments we survey under the “health” rubric, cover right to health and
right to life violations. We have combined these rights under the same
category because violations of the right to life are outrageous violations of
the right to health. They are also combined because health has been
traditionally raised as a justification for prohibitionist drug policies. It is
therefore greatly important to show the extent to which prohibition damages
health. Lastly, we will briefly identify additional arguments that arise from
other rights-framings.
A.

67

Health

Id. at ¶¶ 61, 96–122.
Id. at ¶¶ 42–49. The Court considers that there was no “act of application” of the criminal code, only
of the health normativity.
69
See CPF, DOF 14-8-1931, últimas reformas DOF 24-01-2020, arts. 329–34.
70
Amparo en revisión 1388/2015, supra note 66, ¶¶ 120–121.
68
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The normative status of the right to health is strong in Mexico. Article
4 of the Constitution enshrines it in explicit language.71 It is also guaranteed
in key international human rights sources that make up a part of the Mexican
Bill of Rights. These include the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights72 or the San Salvador Protocol to the American
Convention of Human Rights. 73 As made clear by the many auxiliary
interpretative sources developed by international institutions in the domain
of international human rights law, there are multiple and consequential
dimensions of normativity and enforceability of this right.74
The large body of health-related international sources has recently
increased its profile for two reasons. First, the Inter-American Court
confirmed in Poblete Vilches v. Chile and Cuscul Pivaral v. Guatemala, that
the right to health and other economic and social rights are directly
enforceable under Article 26 of the American Convention.75 This was a bold
move by the Inter-American Court. It is still unclear how this line of
71

CPEUM, art. 4, DOF 05-02-1917. “All persons have the right to health protection. The law shall
determine the grounds and conditions to access health services and shall establish the jurisdiction of the
Federation and the Local Governments with regards sanitation, as provided in section XVI of Article 73 of
this Constitution.”
72
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 (“1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to
the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) The
provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of
the child; (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention,
treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions
which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.”).
73
Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador” art. 10, Nov. 16, 1999,
O.A.S.T.S. No. A-52 (“Right to health. 1. Everyone shall have the right to health, understood to mean the
enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being. 2. In order to ensure the exercise
of the right to health, the States Parties agree to recognize health as a public good and, particularly, to adopt
the following measures to ensure that right: a. Primary health care, that is, essential health care made
available to all individuals and families in the community; b. Extension of the benefits of health services to
all individuals subject to the State's jurisdiction; c. Universal immunization against the principal infectious
diseases; d. Prevention and treatment of endemic, occupational and other diseases; e. Education of the
population on the prevention and treatment of health problems, and f. Satisfaction of the health needs of
the highest risk groups and of those whose poverty makes them the most vulnerable”).
74
See, e.g., U.N. ESCOR, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of
Health (Art. 12), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
75
Poblete Vilches v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
349 (Mex.) (protecting the right to health on the basis of Article 26 of the American Convention); Cuscul
Pivaral v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 359 (Mex.) (protecting the right to health on the basis of Article 26 of the American
Convention). See also Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Comptroller”)
v. Perú, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
198; Lagos del Campo v. Perú, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 340; Trabajadores Cesados de Petroperú y otros v. Perú, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 344; San Miguel Sosa v.
Venezuela, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 348; On the Environment and Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-23/2017, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23 (Mex.). See EDUARDO FERRER MAC-GREGOR ET
AL., INCLUSIÓN, IUS COMMUNE Y JUSTICIABILIDAD DE LOS DESCA EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA
INTERAMERICANA: EL CASO LAGOS DEL CAMPO Y LOS NUEVOS DESAFÍOS (2018).
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precedent will settle, but it undoubtedly has the potential to be an
extraordinarily rich source of new standards regarding the guarantee of the
right to health. Second, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights began to process individual complaints. 76 The
Committee now expounds on the importance of guaranteeing the high
standards of health protected in positive law at the request of individuals, not
just at the request of States or through ex officio means. This may further
develop the right to health’s multiple dimensions of enforceability.
The Mexican Supreme Court, although late and somehow modestly in
comparison to other Latin American high courts, is finally deciding cases
based on the right to health.77 Its most recent ruling on the therapeutic use of
marijuana (AR 57/2019) is grounded on the right to the highest attainable
level of health.78 As a result, the Court directed the Ministry of Health to
issue corresponding regulations within 180 days. In June 2017, the General
Health Law was amended to legalize the therapeutic use of marijuana.
However, it wasn’t until 2021 that Mexican authorities finally passed the
regulations necessary for cannabis to be legally used for research and
medicinal purposes.79
Prohibition has devastating effects on the health and lives of
individuals, and these effects urgently require a system of regulation of all
drugs and all drug use, regardless of their purpose. Prohibition violates the
right to health for various reasons. First, violence resulting from the
enforcement of prohibition has been so detrimental to health that it
concomitantly endangers the right to life. Second, current drug laws
negatively affect the health of drug users. Third, supply reduction through
eradication implies serious risks to the health of farmers and their
76

See G.A. Res. 63/117, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights (Dec. 10, 2008), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCESCR.aspx.
77
See generally Francisca Pou Giménez, Los albores de la justiciabilidad del derecho a la salud en
México: el caso Pabellón 13 [The Dawn of Justiciability of the Right to Health in Mexico: The Pabellón
Case], in DIEZ SENTENCIAS EMBLEMÁTICAS DE LA SUPREMA CORTE [TEN EMBLEMATIC JUDGMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT] 135–56 (Pedro Salazar et al. eds., 2019) (regarding the emergence of health-related
constitutional adjudication in Mexico); Alfredo Gutiérrez Ortiz-Mena, La justiciabilidad del derecho a la
salud en México [The Justiciability of the Right to Health in Mexico, 5 REV. DEL CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS
CONSTITUCIONALES 325 (2017); Rodrigo Gutiérrez Rivas, La justiciabilidad del derecho a la salud en
México y en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos [The Justiciability of the Right to Health in
Mexico and in the Inter-American Human Rights System], 5 REV. DEL CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS
CONSTITUCIONALES, 517 (2017); Alejandro González Pina, Los derechos sociales y su exigibilidad.
Algunos problemas para su protección a través del juicio de amparo [Social Rights and their
Enforceability. Some Problems for Your Protection Through Amparo Lawsuit], 5 REV. DEL CENTRO DE
ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES, 455 (2017). Fernanda Cobo & Sofía Charvel, Mexican Apex Judiciary and
its Multiple Interpretations: Challenges for the Constitutional Right to Health, 18 INT’L J. CONST. L, 1254
(2021).
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Segunda Sala de la SCJN, 14-08-2019, amparo en revisión 57/2019.
79
See LGS, Reglamento de la Ley General de salud en materia de control sanitario para la producción,
investigación y uso medicinal del cannabis y sus derivados farmacológicos [Regulation of the General
Health Law on Sanitary Control for the Production, Research and Medicinal Use of Cannabis and its
Pharmacological Derivatives] DOF 12-01-2021.
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communities. Fourth, the use of the criminal justice system to punish drug
crimes results in risks to individuals and to public health, a development that
is especially worrisome given that many people prosecuted for drug crimes
are indicted for possession without the intent to sell. In the following
sections, we present evidence that shows how health—and in many cases,
life—is undermined by prohibition.
1.

Violence and detriment to health

Enforcement of prohibition in recent years has taken a toll on the
health and lives of thousands of individuals and communities. In 2007,
Mexico had a historically low rate of homicides, with eight homicides per
100,000 inhabitants.80 The trend abruptly changed after the adoption of a
harsher prohibition policy in 2006.81 By 2009, the homicide rate had reached
twenty homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. 82 According to the National
Institute of Statistics and Geography, from 2006 to 2018, over a quarter of a
million homicides occurred in a country with 125.3 million people.83 The
increase in homicides was so apparent that it had a direct negative impact on
life expectancy.84 From 2005 to 2010, life expectancy at the national level
decreased by 0.6%.85 And regions most affected by the war on drugs showed
a more prominent reduction. In Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Durango, life
expectancy decreased by three years over the same period.86
Several studies show that the homicide crisis was driven by
prohibition enforcement methods. Military deployment throughout the
country, 87 as well as beheadings of prominent members of criminal
80
See Consejo Nacional de la Población [National Population Council], La Situación Demográfica
en México [The Demographic Situation in Mexico], GOBIERNO DE MEX. (Sept. 2019),
https://www.gob.mx/conapo/documentos/la-situacion-demografica-de-mexico-2018; INSTITUTO
NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y GEOGRAFÍA [INEGI] [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS AND
GEOGRAPHY], MORTALIDAD, CONJUNTO DE DATOS: DEFUNCIONES POR HOMICIDIOS, INFORMACIÓN
DE 1990 A 2019 [MORTALITY DATA SET: DEATHS FROM HOMICIDES, INFORMATION FROM 1990 TO
2019], https://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/defuncioneshom.
asp?s=est.
81
See Consejo Nacional de la Población, supra note 80; INEGI, supra note 80.
82
See id.
83
See INEGI, supra note 80.
84
See Zedillo et al., supra note 2, at 107.
85
José Manuel Aburto et al., Homicides in Mexico Reversed Life Expectancy Gains for Men and Slowed
Them for Women, 2000–10, 35 HEALTH AFFS. 88 (2016).
86
See Zedillo et al., supra note 2, at 131.
87
Id. Several studies have established causality between the security strategy implemented by the 2006–
2012 Administration and the increase in violence. Laura Atuesta, Militarización de la lucha contra el
narcotráfico: los operativos militares como estrategia para el combate del crimen organizado
[Militarization of the Fight Against Drug Trafficking: Military Operations as a Strategy to Combat
Organized Crime], in LAS VIOLENCIAS: EN BUSCA DE LA POLÍTICA DE DROGAS DETRÁS DE LA GUERRA
CONTRA LAS DROGAS [VIOLENCE: IN SEARCH OF DRUG POLICY BEHIND THE WAR ON DRUGS], (Laura
Atuesta & Alejandro Madrazo eds., 2018) (showing how shootouts with federal forces, especially with the
military, result in increases of violence both in short and long term); Laura H. Atuesta & Aldo F. Ponce,
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organizations involved in the illicit drugs market (also known as the “kingpin
strategy”88), had a detrimental effect. 89 In the context of weak institutions,
impunity, and lack of rule of law, the strategies adopted to curb the illicit
drugs markets ended up fueling the homicide epidemic. This crisis was the
result of policies implemented in the name of the war on drugs.90
Beyond life expectancy, violence takes a serious toll on health. Health
problems resulting from prohibition include depression, alcohol abuse,
suicidal behavior, and psychological problems.91 People in Mexico spend a
substantial portion of their lives in fear. In Mexico, there has been an increase
in the average number of years lived in vulnerability due to social changes
both in the public sphere and at home.92 In 2014, seven years into the “war
on drugs,” female life expectancy at age twenty was fifty-nine and a half
years. 93 Seventy-one percent of a woman’s life was spent in “perceived
Meet the Narco: Increased Competition Among Criminal Organizations and the Explosion of Violence in
Mexico, 18 GLOB. CRIME 375, 376 (2017) (explaining that increased intervention by law enforcement
increases the number of assassinations and unrest, which leads to the creation of more criminal
organizations); Gabriela Calderón et al., The Beheading of Criminal Organizations and the Dynamics of
Violence in Mexico, 59 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1455, 1456 (2015) (correlating the dramatic increase in
homicide rates in 2006 to the start of President Calderón’s campaign against drug cartels); Valeria Espinosa
& Donald B. Rubin, Did the Military Interventions in the Mexican Drug War Increase Violence?, 69 AM.
STAT. 17, 24 (2015) (claiming military intervention in the drug war caused in increase in the average
homicide rate); Javier Osorio, The Contagion of Drug Violence: Spatiotemporal Dynamics of the Mexican
War on Drugs, 59 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1403, 1407 (2015) (proposing a theory of criminal competition
whereby government intervention reduces the power of one criminal organization and therefore encourages
a rival organization to strike its weakened competitor); Brian J. Phillips, How Does Leadership
Decapitation Affect Violence? The Case of Drug Trafficking Organizations in Mexico, 77 J. POLITICS 324,
326 (2015) (explaining why leadership decapitation can sometimes have the unintended effect of increasing
levels of violence); José Merino, Los operativos conjuntos y la tasa de homicidios: Una medición [Joint
Operations and the Homicide Rate: A Measurement], NEXOS (June 1, 2011),
https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=14319 (using statistical tools to argue that the strong correlation between
government intervention and violence is causal); see Zedillo et al., supra note 2, at 107.
88
See Patrick Corcoran, Mexico President Reprises Controversial Kingpin Strategy, INSIGHT CRIME
(June 6, 2017), https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mexico-president-reprises-controversial-kingpinstrategy/.
89
Calderón et al., supra note 87 (finding evidence that the capturing and killing of drug cartel leaders
had exacerbating effects not only on Drug Trade Organization related violence but also on homicides that
affected the general population).
90
In 2006, the federal security cabinet announced the first deployment of federal troops. The minister of
interior stated that the purpose of this deployment was eradication of illicit crops as well as the
establishment of checkpoints to stop narcotics on highways and state roads. See Anuncios sobre la
Operación Conjunta Michoacán [Announcement Regarding the Joint Operation Michoacán] PRESIDENCIA
DE LA REPÚBLICA (Dec. 11, 2006), https://www.resdal.org/caeef-resdal/assets/mexico---anuncio-sobre-laoperaci%C3%B3n-conjunta-michoac%C3%A1n.pdf.
91
Zedillo et al., supra note 2, at 132. The authors mention how exposure to violence is associated with
lower weight at birth of children born to women of scarce economic resources and those born to women
with mental health problems (citing Ryan Brown, The Mexican Drug War and Early-Life Health: The
Impact of Violent Crime on Birth Outcomes, 55 DEMOGRAPHY 319 (2018)). See also Stephen Buka et al.,
Youth Exposure to Violence: Prevalence, Risks, and Consequences, 71 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 298
(2001). Violence may also affect the health of the exposed population by increasing the rates of
posttraumatic stress disorder and depression.
92
See Vladimir Canudas-Romo et al., Mexico’s Epidemic of Violence and its Public Health Significance
on Average Length of Life, 71 J. EPIDEMIOL. CMTY. HEALTH 188 (2017).
93
Id.
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vulnerability” due to violence occurring in the public sphere and twenty-six
percent because of domestic violence. For males, life expectancy at age
twenty was fifty-four and a half years. 94 Sixty-four percent of that time lived
with perceived vulnerability because of violence occurring at the State
sphere and twenty percent because of domestic violence.95
Evidence of negative effects on vulnerable populations caused by the
war on drugs is also compelling. A recent study showed that the early
gestational exposure to the drug war is associated with a substantial decrease
in birth weight.96 Another study found that collective violence has specific
effects on older adults and is associated to weight loss and other geriatric
problems. 97 Thus, violence may indirectly affect individuals’ health,
especially in vulnerable groups.
2.

Health of people who use drugs

The wellbeing, health, and other fundamental rights of people who use
drugs should be at the center of drug policy. Yet prohibition often
undermines the health of drug users. Repressive drug policies contribute to
higher risks of contracting HIV (linked to unsafe injections), discriminatory
policies, and lack of treatment for people with problematic use of drugs.98 In
Mexico, despite the harsh enforcement tactics of the State, the use of illegal
drugs has increased. According to the National Survey on Consumption of
Drugs, Alcohol, and Tobacco (ENCODAT, 2017), there was a general rise
in the number of people who use drugs, from 4.1% in 2002, to 7.2% in 2011.
From 2011 to 2016, the numbers again to 9.9%. 99 Compared to other
countries, however, drug use and dependence estimates in Mexico are still
low.100
For people who use drugs, prohibition entails many health risks. Drug
prohibition contributes to overdose risks in various ways, due to the presence
of adulterants in drugs used, rushed injections, lack of ready access to opioid
94

Id.
Id.
96
See Zedillo et al., supra note 2, at 132.
97
See Carmen García-Peña et al., Collective Violence and the Health of the Elderly: A Cross-sectional
Analysis of a Population-based National Survey in Mexico, 41 REV. PANAM. SALUD PÚB. (29th ed. 2017).
98
Joanne Csete et al., supra note 1, at 1428.
99
COMISIÓN NACIONAL CONTRA LAS ADICCIONES, ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE CONSUMO DE DROGAS,
ALCOHOL Y TABACO 2016–2017: REPORTE DE DROGAS (ENCODAT) [NATIONAL SURVEY ON
CONSUMPTION OF DRUGS, ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO: REPORT ON DRUGS] 21, 47–48 (Secretaría de Salud
Mexico ed. 2017). According to the survey, use by women increased more than by men, with the use of
any drug increasing from 0.7% to 1.3% and illegal drugs from 0.4% to 1.1%. Use in youth (12–17 years)
also experienced an increase, from 0.6% to 3.1% for any drug, and from 1.5% to 2.9% for illegal drugs.
100
See Zedillo et al., supra note 2, at 141. According to the authors, the UNODC’s World Drug
Report 2017 estimates “that 5% or a quarter of a billion people between the ages of 15 and 64 years, used
at least one drug in 2015, while 3.8 percent of the adult population used marijuana. Mexico’s numbers are
well below that, at 2.7% for all illegal drugs and 2.1% for marijuana.”
95
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substitution therapy, and unnecessary controls on naloxone (a medication
that can effectively reverse opioid overdose).101
Because prohibition uses the criminal justice system to reduce demand
and supply, eradicate crops, and seize illegal shipments, health aspects of
prohibition are often treated as a secondary issue. The disproportionate
budget allocation demonstrates this disparateness. During Felipe Calderón’s
presidency, for example, the government spent only 2.9% of the 814 billion
pesos assigned to drug policy, on areas of “prevention, treatment, and human
rights.”102
These repressive approaches have translated into fewer resources for
prevention and treatment. 103 As has been noted, people with problematic
drug use “have limited access to treatment, particularly for science-based
services.” 104 In Mexico, just one in five people with need of treatment
receives one and, of those, only about twenty-four percent complete
treatment.105
Treatment opportunities for women are even lower, impinging on the
right to equality. As noted by the Johns Hopkins–Lancet Commission on
Drug Policy and Health, “[women] face enormous barriers to humane and
affordable treatment. In many countries, there is no treatment particularly
designed for women, although it has been recognized that women’s
motivations for, and physiological reactions to, drug use differ from those of
men.”106 While 22.1% of men with problematic use received treatment, only
12.8% of women reported so.107 Treatment for women is often based on the
traditional women’s role.108
Barriers to treatment include distance to treatment centers, lack of
quality in the services provided, stigma associated with use, and lack of
economic resources.109 There are only forty-three public residential centers
where people can receive in-patient treatment. Private residential facilities
with standardized quality care can cost anywhere between $3,500 to $16,000
USD for a forty-five-day treatment, a price outside the reach of most of
101

See Joanne Csete et al., supra note 1, at 1428.
Alejandro Madrazo & Catalina Pérez Correa, Drugs and the Law in Latin America: The Legal,
Institutional and Social Costs of Drug Policy, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATIN
AMERICA 453 (Rachel Sieder et al. eds., 2019).
103
See Zedillo et al., supra note 2, at 142.
104
Id. at 143.
105
Id.
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See Joanne Csete et al., supra note 1.
107
See Zedillo et al., supra note 2, at 143.
108
According to Gloria Galaviz, most activities and conversations with women who abuse drugs are
aimed at highlighting the importance of being mothers, wives, and daughters—traditional caregiving roles.
The purpose of rehabilitation treatment is “to change deviated females and guide them towards the social
ideal of women. It is intended that, through self-control and the gift of service to others, women stop
consuming and recover their social function.” Gloria Galaviz, Mujeres, adicción y rehabilitación:
Reflexiones desde la frontera noroeste de México, [Women, Addiction and Rehabilitation: Thoughts from
the Northwestern Mexican Border], 11 SALUD COLECTIVA 367, 373 (2015).
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See Zedillo et al., supra note 2, at 143.
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Mexico’s population. People with scarce resources, living in areas of
extreme poverty and poor public services, go to the so-called anexos or
granjas [annexes or farms] (51.1% of men and 22.9% of women reported
access to treatment). These are low-cost private centers, mostly operating
outside the law, with no official supervision.110
Anexos and granjas are often denounced for keeping patients against
their will and violating human rights. It has been reported that these centers
have, at times, used torture practices and other methods not based on
scientific evidence, to treat patients.111 In 2015, the Institute for Prevention
and Attention of Addictions of Mexico City (IAPA),112 closed twenty-eight
treatment centers due to the inhumane treatment of patients and unsanitary
conditions.113
People who use drugs are often detained by the police, prosecuted, and
even imprisoned.114 In 2016, the most prosecuted drug crime at the state level
was simple possession (31% of crimes punished in prisons),115 a crime that
punishes possession of illicit drugs without the intention to distribute or
sell.116 Punishing simple possession implies that users will remain under the
scope of criminal law (and its institutions) and that many will be imprisoned.
As will be elaborated upon later, prosecution and potential imprisonment
also harms health.
3.

110

Eradication of illicit crops and health

Id. See also Brian Anderson et al., Regulación repensada: la necesidad de nuevas políticas y
normas en el tratamiento de las adicciones [Regulation Rethought: The Need of New Policies and Norms
in the Treatment of Addiction], LAS VIOLENCIAS: EN BUSCA DE LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA DETRÁS DE LA GUERRA
CONTRA LAS DROGAS [VIOLENCE: SEARCHING FOR PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE WAR ON DRUGS] (Laura
Atuesta & Alejandro Madrazo Lajous eds., 2018).
111
Zedillo et al., supra note 2, at 144. “[S]tudies and human rights reports based on patient interviews
disclose involuntary retention, often in violent conditions. Interviewees describe physical abuse, including
punishments for minor infractions (not sitting up straight or not paying attention), which include kneeling
on metal bottle caps for hours, sitting on cactuses or a jagged brick, isolation rooms, being struck with
sticks or going without food. Many centers use emotional as well as physical humiliation, particularly in
front of family members. Interviewees also report poor hygienic conditions, overcrowding and lack of
medical services.” See also Galaviz, supra note 108.
112
The IAPA is the institution in charge of reducing the use and abuse of psychoactive substances in
Mexico City. It is also in charge of prevention and treatment programs in the city. See About: IAPA, INSP
VIRTUAL, https://www.iapa.cdmx.gob.mx/dependencia/acerca-de (last visited Nov. 2, 2021).
113
Alberto González, Cierra el IAPA 28 Granjas y Anexos por Tratos Inhumanos [IAPA Closes 28
Farms and Annexes Due to Inhumane Treatments], EL SOL DE MÉXICO (Dec. 11, 2015),
https://www.elsoldemexico.com.mx/metropoli/Cierra-el-IAPA-28-granjas-y-anexos-por-tratosinhumanos-235513.html.
114
See CATALINA PÉREZ CORREA ET AL., AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS, REPORT OF THE LSE EXPERT
GROUP ON THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG POLICY (John Collins ed. 2016) http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/
Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-After-Drug-Wars.pdf [hereinafter AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS].
115
Catalina Pérez Correa & Andrés Ruiz, Marihuana en México: El Peso de la Prohibición
[Marijuana in Mexico: The Weight of the Ban], 28 CUADERNOS DE TRABAJO PROGRAMA DE POLÍTICA DE
DROGAS DEL CIDE [CT-CIDE-PPD] 1, 62 (2018).
116
AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS, supra note 114, at 31–32.
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Eradication of illicit crops—especially through aerial spraying—is
one of the more obvious ways in which current drug policies negatively
affect the right to health 117 and other Constitutional principles, such as
equality. Mexico is one of the main producers of illicit cannabis and opium
poppy in the world, although, due to its illicit character, the precise extent of
production is unknown. 118
Eradication of opium poppy and cannabis usually takes place either
by manually pulling out the plants and burning the crops or through the aerial
spraying of chemicals.119 Aerial spraying is particularly worrisome due to
the toxicity of the chemicals, the difficulty of containing them within the
target area, and the potential harm to nearby farming communities and drug
users who may later consume these chemicals. 120 Poppy plantations in
Mexico are usually eradicated using glyphosate.121 Glyphosate’s use in crop
eradication, and its risks, are now better known because of the Colombian
Constitutional Court’s recent decision ruling against the constitutionality of
this chemical eradication technique. 122 Evidence suggests that, when
consumed through treated crops, glyphosate may lead to myriad health issues
such as vomiting, diarrhea, nausea, and headaches.123 In Colombia, the use
of glyphosate to eradicate illegal coca plantations resulted in a rise in medical
consultations related to dermatological and respiratory illnesses in
communities where the herbicide is sprayed.124 The health risks associated
with aerial spraying of pesticides125 led the Colombian Constitutional Court
to order the suspension of the program first in 2015126 and again in 2019.127
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See Joanne Csete et al., supra note 1, at 1428.
See Catalina Pérez Correa & Andrés Ruiz, A ras de tierra: marihuana y pesticidas [At Ground
Level: Marijuana and Pesticides], 40 NEXOS 18, (2018) [hereinafter At Ground Level] (estimates of
production are made using data on eradication).
119
See México gobierno de la republica [Government of Mexico], Destrucción de Plantíos Ilícitos:
Protocolo Nacional de Actuación [Destruction of Illicit Plants: National Protocol of Intervention]
(2018), https://transparencia.info.jalisco.gob.mx/sites/default/files/u528/Prot_Nal_Act_Destruccion_Plant
ios_Ilicitos.pdf.
120
See Catalina Pérez Correa & Andrés Ruiz, In the Name of Public Health: Forced Eradication of
Cannabis Crops and Use of Pesticides (unpublished paper) (on file with authors) [hereinafter In the Name
of Public Health].
121
Id.
122
Corte Constitucional de Colombia [C.C.] [Colombian Constitutional Court], febrero 7, 2017,
Sentencia T-080/17.
123
Martin Jelsma, Círculo vicioso: la Guerra química y biológica a las drogas [Vicious Circle:
Chemical
and Biological Warfare on Drugs], TRANSNAT’L INSTITUTE (May 8, 2001), https://www.tni.org/
es/publicacion/circulo-vicioso.
124
Adriana Camacho & Daniel Mejía, The Health Consequences of Aerial Spraying Illicit Crops:
The Case of Colombia, 54 J. HEALTH ECON. 147 (2017).
125
Adam Isacson, The Costs of Restarting Aerial Coca Spraying in Colombia, WASH. OFF. ON LAT.
AM. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.wola.org/analysis/costs-restarting-aerial-spraying-coca-colombia/.
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See Sentencia T-080/17, supra note 122.
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See Isacson, supra note 125.
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Even Mexican authorities have recognized the negative consequences of
glyphosate when it comes to human health, the environment, and the soil.128
A different chemical, called paraquat, is used in cannabis eradication,
and is also sometimes used for poppy eradication. Paraquat, is a
commercially used herbicide that deters photosynthesis and dries the
plant.129 Plants treated with paraquat must remain in the sun for two or more
days for desiccation to take effect. Plants can be picked immediately after
being sprayed with paraquat without significant changes occurring. But if
the plant is later ingested, paraquat may negatively affect the health of
consumers.130
Different medical studies have associated paraquat with severe health
problems. Symptoms of paraquat poisoning include pulmonary fibrosis,
diarrhea, intestinal bleeding, hepatic damage, and skin problems. 131
Accumulated exposure to paraquat may lead to the development of
Parkinson’s disease. 132 Paraquat can remain in the soil for up to three
years.133 The health risks may affect both the farmers reaping the crops and
the people living or working nearby.
4.

Prisons and health

As previously mentioned, drug laws prescribe prison sentences,
including mandatory pretrial detention, for most conduct related to illegal
drugs. Mexican prisons, however, represent a risk to health due to
overcrowding, lack of hygiene, and the lack of basic resources like food,
water, blankets, proper health services, or medicine available to its
inhabitants.134 Overcrowding increases the risk of violence and creates an
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Freya Kamel, Paths from Pesticides to Parkinson’s, 341 SCIENCE 722–23 (2013).
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See COMISIÓN FEDERAL PARA LA PROTECCIÓN CONTRA RIESGOS SANITARIOS [FEDERAL
COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION AGAINST SANITARY RISKS], CATÁLOGO DE PLAGUICIDAS [PESTICIDE
CATALOGUE], annex 1, 448 (2016). The Commission warns that Paraquat causes injuries to the tissues it
has contact with: it dries the skin of the hands, may cause the nails to fall out, it may cause ulcers and
blisters if contact with the skin prolongs, and if absorbed by the skin in significant doses may lead to
systematic poisoning. It is also toxic to liver, lungs, heart, kidneys, cornea, and the digestive system. If
ingested, it can produce convulsions, pulmonary edema, burns in mouth and throat, tachycardia, vomit, and
even death. If inhaled, its effects range from nose and throat irritation to nasal hemorrhage.
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See generally Elena Azaola, Las condiciones de vida en las cárceles mexicanas [Life Conditions
in Mexican Prisons], 49 REV. MEXICANA DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIALES 87 (2007).
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unhealthy environment for people who are imprisoned.135 In a 2015 report,
the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) stated, “[i]n
addition to the main problem of overcrowding, [prisons] also suffer from
more serious and precarious conditions due to the federated states’ lack of
financial resources.”136 The report also noted that imprisoned people often
pay prison staff for “services and basic goods, such as food, water and health.
They are also required to pay a regular fee in order to avoid being beaten
and/or abused in detention centers.”137 According to the National Human
Rights Commission, between January 1 and October 20, 2019, there were
4,702 complaints of human rights violations in Mexican prisons. The rights
most often mentioned in the complaints were the right to health, to personal
integrity, to due process, to freedom, and to humane treatment.138
Many people incarcerated for drug crimes are held in local prisons,
which generally have even worse prison conditions.139 Yet, while federal
detention centers usually have better conditions and are generally safer than
local institutions, they are also extremely repressive. As stated by the
IACHR:
[Federal prisons] are characterized by the use of prolonged
isolation regimes (up to 22 and sometimes 23 hours a day),
restrictions of communication between inmates and serious
difficulties with outside contact… In one of the cells where three
inmates were subjected to solitary confinement, the
Commission observed deplorable conditions in terms of
cleanliness: in particular, the toilet was dirty, the cell was
littered with garbage, rotten food, paper, and even a used
sanitary pad was observed. One of these inmates, who allegedly
had been punished for four days, stated: “since we arrived on
Saturday, they have not let us take the trash out. They have not
allowed access to our things; we have no toothbrushes. I have

135
Sergio Chaparro et al., Irrational Punishment: Drug Laws and Incarceration in Latin America, 12
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE DROGAS Y DERECHO [CEDD] [RESEARCH CONSORTIUM ON DRUGS AND
THE LAW] (Coletta Youngers et al. eds. 2017), http://www.drogasyderecho.org/wpcontent/uploads/
2015/10/Irrational_Punishments_ok.pdf.
136
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS [IACHR], COUNTRY REPORT, SITUATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN MEXICO 147 (Dec. 2015), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Mexico2016en.pdf.
137
Id. at 148.
138
COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS [CNDH] [NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS], DIAGNÓSTICO NACIONAL DE SUPERVISIÓN PENITENCIARIA [NATIONAL DIAGNOSIS OF
PRISON SUPERVISION 552 (2019) https://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/sistemas/DNSP/DNSP_2019.pdf.
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See INEGI, CENSO NACIONAL DE GOBIERNO, SEGURIDAD PÚBLICA Y SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO
ESTATAL (2019), https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/cngspspe/2019/; see also INEGI, CENSO
NACIONAL DEL SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO FEDERAL (2018), https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/cnspef/2
018/.
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been menstruating since Saturday and they have only provided
two sanitary pads.140
Violence within prisons poses a risk to the life of inmates. As the
IACHR has stated, “[c]ontinuous violations of the right to life of persons
deprived of liberty are currently one of the main problems in prisons in the
region. Every year hundreds of inmates in the Americas die of different
causes, particularly as a result of prison violence.” The National Human
Rights Commission reported forty homicides and sixty suicides in Mexican
prisons during 2019.141
Other health risks within prisons include a higher prevalence of HIV
and hepatitis B and C, due to the shared use of needles for drug injection,
tattooing with homemade and unsterilized kits, and high-risk sex and rape.142
Prisoners also face a higher risk of contracting tuberculosis.143 These health
risks are shared by prison personnel and inmates’ families, known as a bridge
population between the inmates and the general population.
Additionally, most prisons lack treatment for inmates with addiction,
in violation of their rights to health and non-discrimination.144 As stated by
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, people deprived of their
liberty should have access to treatment and other health equipment: “[d]rug
use, including by injection, has been consistently documented to occur in
prisons throughout the world. High rates of injecting equipment sharing lead
to an elevated risk of HIV transmission in prisons. Persons in custodial
settings are entitled, without discrimination, to the same standard of health
care found on the outside, including with regard to prevention, harm
reduction and antiretroviral therapy.”145
For families of inmates, incarceration also has severe health
consequences. This is particularly true for women, who usually provide the
basic necessities to their family members in prison.146 A recent study shows
140

See IACHR, supra note 136.
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142
See generally SERGIO CHAPARRO HERNÁNDEZ & CATALINA PÉREZ CORREA, SOBREDOSIS
CARCELARIA Y POLÍTICA DE DROGAS EN AMÉRICA LATINA [PRISON OVERDOSE AND DRUG POLICY IN LATIN
AMERICA] (2017).
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Iacoppo Baussano et al., Tuberculosis Incidence in Prisons: A Systematic Review, 7 PLOS MED (2010).
144
CNDH, MECANISMO NACIONAL DE PREVENCIÓN DE LA TORTURA [NATIONAL MECHANISM FOR THE
PREVENTION OF TORTURE] (2016), https://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/default/files/documentos/
2019-03/Inf_2016.pdf.
145
Human Rights Council Res. 28/28, U.N. Doc. A/30/65, at ¶ 21. See also, Joanne Csete et al., supra
note 1, at 1427.
146
A 2014 survey of people visiting family members in Mexican prisons indicated similar kinds of
challenges in that setting. Of the visitors, who were mostly women, more than 50% said that because of the
imprisonment of a spouse or family member they had had to get a job or an additional job. By contrast 41%
said that they had lost a job, more than 18% said that they had had to move, and almost 40% said the
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that both perceived stress and hair cortisol levels were significantly higher
in Mexican women with an incarcerated family member as compared to
women without one. 147 Women who reported incarceration of a family
member “had 41% higher odds of carotid atherosclerosis compared with
those who did not.”148 Also, these women were more likely to smoke, be
obese, and have diabetes. They were also more frequently exposed to
violence. The study concluded that incarceration may have a long-lasting
impact on the physical health of families affected by the imprisonment. This
is true for incarceration in general, and in the case of drug crimes, especially
non-violent ones, the crime itself may be outweighed by the potential longlasting harm.149
In conclusion, prohibition has immense negative effects on health and
other basic rights, including life, integrity, and dignity. These negative
effects outweigh damage from drug consumption. Regulation is therefore
necessary to address health concerns because drug use is not entirely free
from risk. However, regulation is a viable solution to the tragic number of
life and health problems associated with prohibition. Health is a central
commitment of the Mexican legal system and yet it remains structurally
frustrated by the Mexican policy approach.
B.

Free Development of Personality

The second framing that explains why current drug policies are
incompatible with the Constitution, is the right to the free development of
personality. This framing is crucial for two reasons. First, it immediately
renders illegitimate the sort of moralistic and perfectionistic considerations
that lurk behind prohibitionist policies. Second, it demonstrates why drug
use is often part of human activities that contemporary constitutional law
positively values. This creates tension with the categorical denigration of
drug users as part of the “criminal class” that prohibitionist drug policies
have installed in the collective imagination. Although not explicitly explored
in this article, some dimensions we identify as protected could even be
considered protected by the right to freedom of conscience and religion.
However, the right to the free development of personality fits as a more
appropriate lens for the purposes of this article.

problems also disproportionately affected spouses of those incarcerated, including high blood pressure and
depression. See CATALINA PÉREZ CORREA, LAS MUJERES INVISIBLES: LOS COSTOS DE LA PRISIÓN Y LOS
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ON WOMEN] (2014).
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The right to the free development of personality is explicitly
recognized as a fundamental right in a number of constitutions including
Germany,150 Spain,151 Colombia,152 and Perú.153 The American Convention
of Human Rights also guarantees it. 154 In Mexico, the Supreme Court has
derived it from the fundamental right to human dignity, recognized in Article
1 of the Constitution, and found to be implicit in international human rights
treaties. 155 The Court has emphasized its constitutional status and has
consistently used it for more than ten years in a strand of jurisprudence
covering gender identity, divorce, and other aspects of family law, and, most
famously, the personal use of marijuana.156
We next discuss how arguments based on this right operate, and point
to its transformative potential for drug policy, beyond cannabis. We will also
survey how drug-use related arguments based on this right have been used
by the Mexican Supreme and other courts in comparative settings.
1.

The structure and scope of the right to free development
of personality

The concept of free development of personality reflects a dimension
of autonomy commonly associated with the writings of John Stuart Mill.157
Mill observed that human nature is not a machine destined to perform a
prescribed function. Rather, that human nature should be pictured as a tree,
which needs to grow and develop on all sides, following the internal
150

Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 2 (1), translation available at http://www.gesetze -iminternet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (Ger.).
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(Nov. 24, 2017).
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for all other fundamental rights.] Pleno de la SCJN, SJFG, Novena Época, Tomo XXX, Diciembre de 2009,
Tesis P. LXV/2009, 8. See also Pleno de la SCJN, 6 enero, 2009, amparo directo 6/2008; Primera Sala de
la SCJN, 4 noviembre, 2015, amparo en revisión 237/2014 (on how the Court presents the status of the
right).
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See Primera Sala de la SCJN, 4 noviembre, 2015, amparo en revisión 237/2014; Primera Sala de
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en revisión 623/2017; Segunda Sala de la SCJN, 4 julio, 2018, amparo en revisión 1163/2017 (on
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2017). See supra note 37.
157
Carlos Alberto Jaramillo Rojas, Libertad negativa y libre desarrollo de la personalidad en la
jurisprudencia constitucional colombiana: un análisis desde la perspectiva de John Stuart Mill y Thomas
Hobbes’ [Negative Liberty and Free Development of Personality in Colombian Constitutional
Jurisprudence: An Analysis from the Perspective of John Stuart Mill and Thomas Hobbes] 3 PRECEDENTE
REVISTA JURÍDICA 71, 117–18 (2013).

90

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 1

impulses that makes it a living entity. 158 Mill vindicated the right of
individuals to experience different ways of life and famously remarked that
we value our decisions not because they are the best possible ones, but
because they are the ones we have made and identify with.159
This right is understood as a general right to freedom, 160 with a
residual character.161 It comes into play whenever an action or interest is not
protected by a more specific right. In a legal order that protects the free
development of the personality, there are no constitutionally irrelevant
exercises of freedom. Any decision that a person associates with the
development of her personality will be protected unless the limitation is
appropriately justified.162
Some courts have distinguished several dimensions of the right’s
scope. The German Constitutional Court, for instance, distinguishes between
freedom of action (external dimension) and the personal sphere (internal
dimension). Freedom of action authorizes people to do what they desire
insofar as it does not interfere with others or with social order, allowing
individuals to define themselves concerning society.163 The personal sphere
marks out a sphere of privacy within which individuals enjoy the freedom to
determine who they are and how they relate to the world—if at all.164
The Mexican Supreme Court has said that “the individual, whoever he
is, has the right to freely and autonomously choose his life project, the way
in which he will achieve the goals and objectives that, for him, are
relevant.” 165 The Court highlighted that the right to free development of
personality obliges the State to recognize:
“[E]veryone’s natural faculty to individually be how she wants
to be, without coercion, or unjustified controls or impediments
by others, in order to meet the goals or objectives she has been
set for herself, that is to say: it is the human person who decides
on the meaning of her own existence, according to her values,
ideas or expectations, etc.”166
158
159
160

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 100 (1985).
Id. at 114.
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], 1 BvR 253/566, Jan. 16,
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(Ger.) https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/1957/01/rs19570116_1
bvr025356en.html (broadly construing article 2, concluding that the right to travel abroad flows from it,
and preventing Wilhelm Elfes from exercising that right).
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BVerfGE, 1 BvR 185/77, June 3, 1980; See Edward J. Eberle, Observations on the Development
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201 (2012); ROBERT ALEXY, supra note 44.
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Although the Court has held that the right to free development of
personality does not have clearly defined “perimeters,”167 it has declared that
the right allows individuals to freely choose how to live their lives. These
choices include the freedom to marry; to procreate; to make choices
regarding one’s personal appearance; and to choose one’s sexual
preference.168 In subsequent cases, the right has protected the decision to
remain married, including the invalidation of “fault divorce” 169 and the
validation of a child marriage ban.170
However, the right to the free development of personality is not
absolute. There is a disconnect between the right’s seemingly broad coverage
and the aspects of personal freedom that are constitutionally protected.
Textually, these limitations are usually associated with reference to
“constitutional order” or other limitation clauses 171 and are interpreted in
relation to their relative harm. The next section will discuss the role of this
“harm principle” in the context of drug policy.
2.

The role of the harm principle in drug policy

Reasoning about harm, to others and to oneself, is central to the right
to the free development of personality. Stuart Mill formulated the “harm
principle” in an effort to manage the tension between liberty and authority.
The principle recognizes the need to simultaneously honor liberty and to
justify the coercive nature of law.172 For Mill, “the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”173
This principle is particularly important because traditional arguments
backing prohibition have been based on the idea that drug consumption is a
sign of “human depravation” leading to the “degeneration of the species.”174
167
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Derecho al libre desarrollo de la personalidad. Aspectos que comprende [Right to the Free
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In Mexico, the idea that drugs contribute to the “degeneration of the race,”
and specifically the idea that drug use leads to narcissism and homosexuality,
was used to support prohibition in the 1920’s and 1930’s. However, no
evidence was ever presented showing this kind of “degenerative” harm from
the use of drugs.175
International conventions also speak of moral goals. For example, the
English text of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 begins its
preamble by stating that the parties are concerned with the “health” and
“welfare” of mankind, but the Spanish version uses the word “moral” of
mankind. 176 Thus, the Spanish version of the treaty reflects a specific
concern with morality.
Moral-perfectionist arguments focus on the erosion of the moral
character that accompanies drug use.177 They exist in open conflict with the
foundations of the right to the free development of personality. Only
paternalistic arguments—those that prioritize the need to avoid individual
self-harm over more fundamental interests—and protective arguments—
those based on the need to protect individuals from harm inflicted by
others—can be preliminarily raised to potentially justify the emission of
criminal statutes against drug use and distribution. Perfectionistic
arguments—those that point to ideals of virtue to be imposed on individuals
regardless of what their preferences are—cannot. Hence, reasoning about
harm to self and harm to others indeed dominates contemporary debates on
drug policy.178
In terms of drug use, these arguments are based on the idea that, if the
law is effective in deterring people from using drugs, it will spare people
from personal and social harm. 179 These arguments also posit that the
increased risk of societal harm from drug use justifies making drugs
illegal.180 Some argue that the criminalization of drug sales stops individuals
from harming themselves. Others argue that criminalizing the sale and
distribution of drugs creates legal barriers that deter potential users and
prevents drug dealers from making profit.181
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Contemporary constitutional courts have largely deconstructed these
arguments, at least in regard to certain drugs. The Mexican Supreme Court
deployed a careful set of arguments in deciding the case, Amparo en revisión
237/2014, in which it analyzed legislation prohibiting the issuance of permits
to engage in activities associated with personal consumption of cannabis.182
The Court started its analysis by establishing that the right to the free
development of personality protects recreational activities in general,
including cannabis consumption.183 The Court then explored whether there
were legitimate goals that might justify the limitation to this right imposed
on individuals through prohibition. It also inquired whether the means
employed could be considered suitable, necessary, and proportional in the
strict sense.184 Having identified the health of consumers and “public order”
as legitimate public goals for limiting marijuana consumption,185 the Court
engaged in a “suitability” analysis grounded in the harm principle. The Court
then questioned whether prohibition could be considered adequate to stop or
diminish the harms stemming from health detriments, drug abuse or
dependency, inclination to use harder drugs, or stimulation to commit other
crimes.186
The Court found certain instrumental connections to some legitimate
public goals, but very weak or negligible ones to others.187 Ultimately, this
level of scrutiny failed at the “necessity” stage of proportionality analysis.
The Court had no difficulty coming up with alternative strategies that were
equally or more appropriate than the “system of prohibitions” to safeguard
the legitimate public goals entertained by the legislation, while minimally
infringing on free development of the personality.188
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Notwithstanding that, the evidence under consideration was not able to prove that marijuana consumption
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The Court concluded that prohibition was not proportional in the
narrow sense since there was no proper equilibrium between the (serious)
degree of affectation on the fundamental right and the (negligible) degree to
which the legislative scheme could be considered to accomplish its goals.189
Other high courts have reached similar conclusions. In Argentina, the
Supreme Court found the criminalization of drug possession for personal use
to be unconstitutional.190 In a ruling that strongly affirmed the constitutional
value of personal autonomy, the Court pointed out that individuals must be
able to lead their lives autonomously and free from undue interference
associated to oppressive attempts to “enlighten their decisions.”191 The Court
further argued that, for individuals to pursue their life plans autonomously,
drug policy must refrain from interfering with conduct that do not harm
others.192 Regarding harm, the Argentine Court largely endorsed the position
that drug use must be recognized as fundamental to an individual’s life plans
even when it includes a concomitant decision to harm oneself or produce
possible distress on others, including the relatives or dependents of the
user.193
In Colombia, the Constitutional Court made the free development of
personality one of the more central rights under the 1991 Constitution by
decriminalizing small scale possession of cannabis and cocaine for personal
use.194 The Court found that the prohibitions contained in Articles 51 and 87
of Law 30 (1986) were unconstitutional because they intruded on the
privacy, autonomy, and the free development of personality of individuals.195
The Court stated that “[i]f the right to the free development of personality is
to make any sense in our legal system, it must be concluded that, for the
aforementioned reasons regulation making drug use a crime is clearly
unconstitutional.” 196 In 2012, the Constitutional Court confirmed its
decriminalization ruling and held that drug use is a constitutionally protected
activity. Soon after, it approved a new legal framework, which made drug
addiction a matter of public health and obliged state authorities to guarantee
treatment for those who voluntarily seek it.197 In 2019, it also overruled a ban
on the public consumption of cannabis.198
189
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Ending prohibition is also important to eliminate the degree of
“second-level” interference it has on the right to the free development of
personality. This is to say, it seriously compromises life choices—"secondlevel” interference—regardless of the degree to which one incorporates, or
not, drug consumption into one’s life plan—"first-level” interference. This
is because prohibition policies severely violate individual freedoms and
frustrate life plans, independent of one’s relation to drug use.199
Children’s well-being is also affected when their parents’ access to
economic, social, and cultural capital is disrupted by drug violence. Families
are increasingly isolated from employment opportunities, and access to
social interactions and community involvement becomes strained. 200 The
right to the free development of personality, in short, is violated for secondorder reasons because of the social destruction caused by prohibitionist
policies, independently of the degree to which it often violates it for the firstorder reasons traditionally pointed out by the courts.
Finally, to the extent prohibition remains in the law and is enforced by
means extensive punitive criminal law, rights impingements will ultimately
fall not only on the right to the free development of the personality, but also
on other prerequisite rights, especially the right to personal freedom. Due to
the ever-present character of drug-based repression, the existence of pretrial
detention for drug related crimes, and the disproportionately long sentences
attached to these crimes, many situations will involve a continuum of
affectations to the rights to personal integrity, freedom, health, life, and the
free development of personality
3.

From cannabis to other drugs

In recent years, cannabis use, for recreational or medical purposes, has
gained public acceptance around the globe. In the United States, the 2020
elections brought legal cannabis to new states when Arizona, Mississippi,
Montana, New Jersey, and South Dakota approved cannabis legislation.201
This brought the total number of states with legal cannabis markets up to
thirty-six, while fifteen states (in addition to the District of Columbia) have
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regulated markets for adult use.202 In Mexico, public support for medical and
recreational cannabis has changed over the years. A recent poll, conducted
by Congress, shows that almost half of people surveyed believe cannabis
should be regulated, while the other half opposes regulation. 203 Almost
ninety percent approve of regulation for medical purposes.204 Several bills
have been proposed in Congress to regulate cannabis nationally.205 This has
prompted an ongoing debate in Mexico regarding the costs and benefits of
cannabis prohibition.
However, contemporary academics and courts argue that the right to
the free development of personality requires the decriminalization of drug
consumption beyond cannabis. They contend that less commonly used drugs,
such as psilocybin, LSD, mescaline, MDMA, and cocaine should also be
decriminalized. 206 Because so many of these arguments focus on how
prohibition is ineffective at preventing harm, they are relevant in examining
the validity of current prohibitionist drug policies in Mexico. Protection of
individual autonomy applies with equal force to drugs traditionally labeled
as “hard drugs.”207 Even if there are reasons not to favor laissez faire drug
policy, regulation coupled with harm reduction policies is the best way to
prevent harm.
During the 2020 United States elections, several comprehensive
measures towards regulation and harm reduction made it to the ballots. In
the District of Columbia, a ballot initiative was approved to make possession
and use of entheogenic plants (psilocybin) among the lowest law
enforcement priorities. 208 Other cities like Oakland, California and Santa
Cruz, California have already advanced similar decriminalization of plant202
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204
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based psychedelics.209 In these cases, possession or use may still be a crime
but it is not actively prosecuted.210 In Oregon, voters approved a measure
allowing for legal administration of psilocybin products for therapeutic
purposes to those over twenty-one years of age. 211 Oregon also passed a
separate measure decriminalizing possession of heroin, methamphetamines,
LSD, and other substances.212 Although the sale of these substances remains
a crime, possession will only be considered a civil violation subject to a
fine.213 Funds collected through the measure will serve to finance “health
assessments, addiction treatment, harm-reduction efforts and other services
for people with addiction disorders.”214
Expanding regulation recognizes the harms and costs of prohibition
policies and the importance of adopting more effective and rights protective
approaches. It further shows that alternatives to prohibition are possible and
less costly.
C.

Equality

prohibition generates and deepens many forms of structural
inequalities, such as social, economic, gender, cultural, and ethnic-origin
inequalities. It also fosters specific acts of discrimination by permitting and
encouraging prejudice, stigma, and stereotyping to the detriment of
individuals and groups. Current drug policies generate vulnerability,
disadvantages or deepen preexisting causes of the same.215 Because of the
prevailing punitive approach, drug use is generally associated with crime and
other antisocial behavior. This association may even cause denial of
treatment, housing, and employment.216 Women who use drugs face more
severe consequences, such as additional violations of their rights or loss of
child custody. 217 Current policies on drug trafficking and consumption
therefore fail to attain the objectives they pursue.
This situation is at odds with what Mexican constitutional equality
provisions purport to guarantee. Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution
209
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contains an antidiscrimination clause that includes a long, open-ended list of
protected grounds, the normative import of which has been recently
strengthened by the Supreme Court. “Any form of discrimination, based on
ethnic or national origin, gender, age, disabilities, social status, medical
conditions, religion, opinions, sexual orientation, marital status, or any other
form, which violates the human dignity or seeks to annul or diminish the
rights and freedoms of the people, is prohibited.”218 Although the Mexican
Constitution does not contain an openly transformative equality mandate,
court-made equality doctrines are fundamentally aligned with contemporary
equality paradigms. These paradigms were designed to tackle not only
arbitrariness and problems of formal equality, but also structural and
“material” inequalities.219
Thus, the Mexican Supreme Court has declared that material equality
“lies in achieving parity of opportunity in the enjoyment and real and
effective exercise of human rights for all people, which means that in some
cases it is necessary to remove and/or reduce social, political, cultural,
economic or other obstacles that prevent members of certain vulnerable
social groups from enjoying and exercising these rights.” 220 The Court has
also observed that the Constitution protects individuals both against direct
and indirect discrimination.221 It has denounced the infiltration of traditional
218
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gender roles in several legal domains, especially family law.222 It has also
underlined the need to overcome structural discrimination223 and has largely
adopted the analytics of differentiated scrutiny.224 Finally, it has declared the
need to engage in strict scrutiny of public and private conduct whenever this
conduct relies on a suspect category.225
International human rights sources, which enjoy constitutional status
when aligned with Mexican constitutional provisions, provide additional
analytic and argumentative tools for fighting specific forms of inequality.
Gender inequality, for instance, may be countered by the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.226 It may also
be countered by Inter-American instruments that focus on closely connected
issues, like the gender-based violence provisions of the Belem do Pará
Convention.227 The Inter-American Court has given relevance in its rulings
to the notions of disparate impact, indirect discrimination, and the need to
provide special treatment to disadvantaged groups.228
CCCLXXIV/2014, 603 (“[…] la discriminación puede generarse no sólo por tratar a personas iguales de
forma distinta, o por ofrecer igual tratamiento a personas que están en situaciones diferentes; sino que
también puede ocurrir de manera indirecta cuando una disposición, criterio o práctica aparentemente neutral
ubica a un grupo social específico en clara desventaja frente al resto […]”).
222
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Nothing covered so far implies that the Supreme Court has made
progress in denouncing and providing remedies to the many inequalities
created by prohibitionist drug policies. Both the Constitution and the
Supreme Court’s equality doctrines provide the means and foundations
necessary to declare prohibition policies contrary to fundamental rights and
invalidate them. The outcome of amparo directo en revisión 1464/2013, the
case in which the Supreme Court first spoke of material equality, cautions
against triumphalist narratives.229 In that case, a woman denounced disparate
gender effects of prohibitionist drug policies; the Supreme Court found her
disparate effect arguments irrelevant to whether she should be prosecuted,
and eventually allowed the prosecution to continue.230 Because those who
suffer most at the hands of drug policy have scarce access to justice, and
because Mexican courts face difficulty applying equality mandates in the
context of specific life problems.
In the following sections, we illustrate how current repressive drug
policies exacerbate gender and socio-economic inequalities. First, we
discuss disparate impact discrimination in both the content and the
application of criminal law. This discrimination deepens structural
inequalities of various types. Second, we identify problems of direct and
indirect health damage to vulnerable communities, which also consolidate
structural inequalities. These are just two examples of the many ways in
which drug prohibition undermines equality in Mexico. Issues of social,
ethnic-origin, and cultural inequalities also persist and continue to perpetuate
stigma, discrimination, and stereotyping.
1.

Drug-related punishment and gender inequality

There are important differences in how and why men and women are
prosecuted, sentenced, and incarcerated in Mexico. Although most people
incarcerated for drug-related offenses are men, the incarceration rate for
women has grown significantly in recent years.231
At the state level, the number of women entering prison over the past
two years has increased by over 100 percent.232 The most punished crimes at
state level for both men and women are simple possession and possession
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with intent to distribute or sell.233 However, the percentage of women that
are condemned on transportation grounds is higher than the percentage of
men (9.2% for women, 4.2% of men). 234 At the federal level, gender
differences are far more visible. According to the National Institute of
Statistics and Geography (INEGI), in 2017, 7,943 crimes were punished with
federal prison sentences: 95% of them committed by men, and 5% of them
committed by women. 235 An important percentage of these crimes were
tagged as “other crimes of narcotics,” making it impossible to determine the
conduct that was punished. (See Figure below).236 The information available,
indicates that transportation most often imprisons both women and men, but
the percentage for women is 41.7%, and only 18.6% for men. As shown in
the following graph, petty dealing crimes account for 11.2% of the crimes
for which men are in prison, while only 1% for women.237
Figure 1: Drug Related Crimes of Incarcerated Population
Drug related crimes of incarcerated population in Federal Prison Centers 2018
57.1%

60.0%
50.0%

41.7%
34.6%

40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%

18.6%

13.8%

11.2%
1%

1.7% 2.0%

1.3% 0.5%

4.9% 4.9%

4.2%

1.5%

1%

0.0%
Petty dealings l aw

Production

Transport

Source: INEGI - Censo Nacional de Sistema Penitenciario Federal 2018. Available at:
www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/Olap/Proyectos/bd/censos/gobierno2018/CNSPF2018/PobCPF.asp?

Trafficking
Men

Trade

Supply

Possession

Narcotics, others

Women

Determining the gender of punished crimes is important because of
the differing severity of the associated punishments. According to the
Federal Criminal Code, transportation is punishable with 10 to 25 years in
prison, while possession without intent to distribute is punishable with a
minimum of 10 months when drug quantities are below a certain
threshold.238 However, possession may be punished up to a maximum of 15
years when quantities exceed 1,000 times the thresholds established in the
General Health Statute. 239 The difference between the minimum
punishments in each case is significant. Higher incarceration rates for
women for transportation of illegal substances lead to harsher sentences. In
this way, a facially gender-neutral policy has an enormous disparate impact
by failing to account for the different ways in which women and men interact
233
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with the drug market. 240 It constitutes a clear example of indirect
discrimination prohibited by Mexican law.
Current drug policy also fails to acknowledge the different reasons
why women and men become involved in drug markets, and the wider
societal effects the policy perpetuates and reinforces. Many women become
involved in drug-related activity “as a result of poverty or sometimes, due to
coercion by a partner or relative.” 241 Most of them are single mothers,
commit crimes with no violence, “have little or no schooling, live in poverty,
and are responsible for providing care for dependents, whether children,
young people elderly or persons with disabilities.”242 The incarceration of
women can have devastating effects on families and communities, often
leading to further impoverishment. 243 It is thus clear that current drugpolicies are blind to structural inequalities and that they represent a violation
of the state’s obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill rights.
Another reason why drug laws disparately impact men and women is
due to the role women play as caregivers of the incarcerated. Mexican
prisons, like those in many other Latin-American countries, are characterized
by scarcity.244 Food, water, clothing, blankets, shoes, medications, and other
necessities for inmates are typically provided by inmates’ families, and
women typically assume this role as caregivers. 245 Women thus bear a
disproportionate share of the indirect costs of the Mexican prison system.246
By using the criminal justice system, and particularly prison sentences to
punish drug related crimes, prohibition reinforces an unequal system of care,
which disproportionately affects women.
2.

Eradication of illicit crops and social inequality

As discussed above, the way in which illegal crops are eradicated
carries important risks to health. Moreover, they disproportionally affect
rural communities that participate in the drug industry. These communities
participate in the initial levels of the market, where prices and income for
participants are lowest. 247 Official data from Mexico shows that the
municipalities where crop eradication occurs are often deeply impoverished
240
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and rank low in education, accessibility to health services, housing, and other
official welfare indicators. 248 According to the Ministry of Defense, the
municipality with the highest number of eradicated hectares is Badiraguato,
Sinaloa. 249 Data from the National Council for the Evaluation of Social
Policy Development (CONEVAL) shows Badiraguato has a “high” social
lag index.250 Other municipalities with large numbers of eradicated areas,
show similar scores in terms of welfare indicators.251
Evidence shows that current eradication practices pose serious health
risks to farmers, their families, and communities. Eradication policies
seriously damage the health of highly vulnerable populations and are
instrumental in directly and indirectly deepening many causes of structural
inequality.
III.

THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROHIBITION: NONRIGHTS FRAMINGS

Beyond rights violations, prohibitionist drug policies in Mexico have
spurred negative social, legal, and political outcomes as well, fueling
problems of arbitrary enforcement, inefficient use of public resources,
corruption, professional disruption, and environmental damage. Some of
these negative effects amount to a violation of constitutional provisions,
while others have seriously eroded the architectural integrity of the Mexican
Constitution in ways that curb its functionality and undermine its most
fundamental commitments.
In this section, we briefly describe how prohibition, and the repressive
and materially “exceptionalist” policies that accompany it, seriously damage
three main areas of constitutional normativity: (1) market regulation, (2)
federalism, and (3) the principle of legality and other defining dimensions of
the rule of law. Moreover, these policies concurrently destroy the Mexican
State’s ability to fulfill its basic political, legal, and economic functions.
First, current drug policy in Mexico undermines the obligation of the
Mexican State to effectively regulate the economy, as set down in Articles
25, 26, 27, and 28 of the Constitution.252 This occurs because prohibition
fosters a vast illegal, un-regulated market, and because drug cartels have
248
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sufficient economic power to influence both legal and illegal sectors of the
economy.253 prohibition has destroyed many areas of market integrity and
the preconditions for the operation of the constitutionally endorsed “rectoría
económica del Estado” [State orientation of the economy]. As previously
noted, the cartels’ primary purpose is an economic one. Understanding this
is crucial to avoid misconceptions about the nature and impact of criminal
organizations in Mexico, which are radically different from the sort of
politically motivated insurgent groups present in other contexts.
Second, prohibition has completely deformed the territorial division
of powers. While an increase in the powers of the National government to
the detriment of the federated units was a phenomenon common to many
countries in the twentieth century, Mexico has witnessed a chaotic and nonsystematic growth of centralized powers.254
Third, the principle of legality and the wider set of principles
associated with the rule of law have been seriously compromised by
prohibition. Prohibition has progressively replaced the application of
constitutional and criminal law with regimes of exception, without regard for
the safeguards of the formal declaration of “state of emergency” in Article
29 of the Mexican Constitution. 255 In the advancement of this “war on
drugs,”256 an important number of exceptional measures to combat criminal
drug organizations have been enacted and implemented. The “constitutional
costs” of the war on drugs are severe: 257 Prohibition reforms during the
Calderón Administration included the insertion in the Constitution a special
regime that completely disregards procedural safeguards for certain crimes.
More broadly, the enforcement of prohibition has allowed Mexican
authorities to detract attention from systemic failures and permit the
perpetration of arbitrary practices or institutional malfunctions, such as the
government’s incapacity to investigate crimes. Current drug policy appears
at the core of the State’s incapacity to properly investigate crime, the
existence of corruption, and the collapse of individual liberties and due
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process rights. It also effectively prevents the success of independent policies
or initiatives addressed to tackle these problems.
A.

Market Integrity and State Orientation of the Economy

The size and characteristics of illegal drug markets are difficult to
ascertain and are often projected using production estimates.258 Despite this
difficulty, it is clear that prohibition has fostered illegal markets and
consolidated power in a few, extremely powerful, criminal organizations.
Economic analysis of the drug market “demonstrates that prohibiting the
production and consumption of any merchandise for which demand exists,
invariably leads to the creation of a black market by individuals and
organizations willing to violate the law.”259
According to an appraisal made almost a decade ago, before the opioid
and synthetic drugs market had not yet risen to prominence, drug trafficking
was the most profitable of illegal businesses, ten times more profitable than
the second in line (illegal traffic of human beings), and far higher than all
others (e.g., human organs, weapons, or diamonds). 260 A more recent
estimate suggests that the global drug trafficking market was worth between
$426 billion USD and $652 billion USD in 2014.261 According to an estimate
specific to Mexico, the 2001 market value of drug trade was $25 billion
dollars, roughly six percent of Mexico’s gross domestic product.262
Many different factors influence how an illegal industry can affect a
country. Factors may include: the number of participants at each stage of the
production and marketing processes; the role the country plays in the
international drug industry; whether the country is a producer of raw
materials, a drug manufacturer, a money laundering center, or a territory
used for transit; the size of the drug market relative to the rest of the
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economy; and how resources are distributed, among others. 263 Mexico is
both a producer of raw materials like cannabis and opium poppy, a producer
of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines and fentanyl, and a transit
territory.264 The effect of the illegal drug market is therefore complex.
Next, we focus on three features relevant to understanding the
economic effect of drug cartels in Mexico. The first is the size of the illegal
drug market, including the degree the drug cartels have diversified and
infiltrated many sectors of the economy, and the many opportunities this
creates for criminal organizations to distort State economic regulations,
preventing the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities. The second is
the profit-driven character of the Mexican cartels’ project, which, despite the
levels of public and private violence, renders inadequate analysis under the
NIAC (Non-International Armed Conflicts) framework. The third feature
identifies an extreme consequence that current policies exert on the
economic and political dynamics of the country: the recent transformation of
the Mexican Army into an economic agent with economic incentives.
The specific way in which prohibition has been enforced in Mexico—
especially after 2006, when a kingpin strategy and the deployment of the
army to combat organized crime was enforced—has resulted in the use of
open violence by organized-crime groups to expand their market
influence. 265 Drug organizations, in response to prohibition enforcement,
diversified their illegal activities to include kidnapping, extortion, and
trafficking of other illegal goods.266
Recent events around the “huachicol” (fuel diversion and theft)
provide a useful illustration of the cartels’ economic expansion, the effect it
has amidst the violence and disruption propitiated by State responses, and its
direct and varied interconnection with State economic policy measures. In
recent years, fuel theft has undergone important transformations. In the
beginning, this practice was controlled by local bosses. However, the energy
263
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reforms enacted during the Peña Nieto Administration between 2012 and
2018 allowed the price of gasoline to rise, and thus multiplied the incentives
to bypass the legal market. 267 According to analyses of Pemex data, the
number of illicit taps rose from 132 in 2001 to 12,582 in 2018. 268
Huachicolero bands progressively grew in number, importance, and power,
and entered into conflict with the cartels that were dominant in their
respective territory. Over time, this caused a restructuring of both traditional
cartels, who themselves entered the fuel trade (among them the Zetas and the
CJNG), and local bands (some of which have adopted cartel-like practices
and entered new activities in the illegal markets). Even a new cartel has
emerged—Santa Rosa de Lima—whose core activities revolve around
huachicol.269
The impact huachicol has had on State management of the economy
was made transparent in December 2019, when President López Obrador
announced that he was going to stop huachicol and issued a series of orders
to that effect.270 Among other things, the orders interrupted fuel distribution
through the underground pipes and distribution by trucks; placed refineries
under surveillance; fired a number of officials; deployed the army to strategic
points along the distribution networks; and amended the federal criminal
code to make fuel theft a “serious” offense.271 By January 2020, the lack of
planning by the federal government, together with the complexity of the
situation, caused a serious fuel shortage. 272 One report estimated the
economic costs of the shortage to be 23,600 million pesos.273 Soon after, a
terrible explosion in one of the illegal taps in Tlahuelilpan, Hidalgo left more
than 135 people dead, most of whom were local villagers that were illegally
collecting fuel.274 The ineffective presence of the army, who were present at
the time of the explosion, captured a Mexican State incapable or unwilling
to manage the situation.
One of the criticisms of drug regulation is that cartels have diversified
criminal activities to a point where removing the profits from illegal drug
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markets would not weaken their economic power significantly.275 However,
this is untrue. 276 Drug regulation would not just weaken cartel economic
power—it would also allow State agencies to redirect efforts to prevent more
socially harmful crimes, such as human trafficking, kidnapping, and
extortion.
The degree of violence necessary to operate these economic networks
and the “war-on-drugs” has led some to ponder the possibility of resorting
to the law of NIAC.277 As remarked by Rodiles, however, even if the NIAC
qualification finds some footing from a lex lata perspective, it is greatly
misleading and counter-productive.278 The NIAC framework fails to capture
the nature and complexity of the situation and does not reduce levels of
violence.279 Because there are state-armed forces fighting non-state armed
groups in Mexico, and Mexico is a contracting Party to the Geneva
Convention, the conditions for Article 3 of the Convention are fulfilled.280
Under authorized interpretations, Article 3 applies to scenarios where armed
violence is “protracted” and has a high level of intensity. This is usually
measured by the collective nature of the conflict, or by the State’s need to
resort to the army; and non-state armed groups may be considered “parties
to the conflict,” with defined hierarchical organizational structures and the
capacity to sustain military operations.281
It is this latter condition that seems absent in the Mexican scenario.
Although there are some rules organizing activities, networks are
asymmetric and decentralized, and the “codes” enacted by some of the
cartels seem unrelated to their daily operations.282 Although the amount of
power these organizations have amassed defies the State and its agents in
many places, the cartels do not dispute the State’s right to govern. 283
Ultimately, the NIAC framing is not protective enough (since applicable
national and international human rights law is far more protective) and risks
legitimizing more violence on the ground.284
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Lastly, Mexico’s prohibition policies and the resulting violence has
transformed the Mexican army into an important economic actor. This
transformation has been particularly apparent under President Obrador’s
Administration (2018 to present). As previously discussed, the war on drugs
was used to justify the involvement of the army in public security tasks. This
participation evolved into their inclusion in national and internal security
tasks, such as the combat of fuel theft or the control of migration.285 Today,
the army’s presence has spilled over into government tasks. These tasks
include the construction and commercial administration of the new
International Airport of Santa Lucía, the construction of the State-owned
bank “Banco del Bienestar” with offices across the country, the management
of Mexican customs and federal ports, and the operation of programs to
protect the environment.286
The incursion of the army into government functions openly violates
the constitutional purview of the Armed Forces,287 and further compromises
the fulfillment of the economic management and coordination functions of
the State, under articles 25, 26, 27, and 28 of the Mexican Constitution. One
possible negative outcome of military involvement in government functions
is the creation of economic interests within the army, which may incentivize
economically motivated action instead of neutral institutional behavior.288
B.

Federalism

According to Article 40 of the Mexican Constitution, “[i]t is the will
of the people to establish a representative, democratic, secular and federal
Republic, composed of free and sovereign states in all that concerns their
interior regime, and Mexico City, united under one federation which is
established according to the principles of this Fundamental Law.” 289 Yet
prohibition and the war on drugs have taken a massive toll on the country’s
organization as a federal republic in at least three ways. First, through the
enactment of drug laws that centralize decisions about drug policy and
285
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prevent States from adopting distinctive policy approaches. Second, through
the deployment of federal forces to combat criminal organizations. And
third, through the generation of amendments to Article 73 of the
Constitution, which contribute to a capricious and overly complex
distribution of territorial power in the country.
Particularly after 2006, drug policy has been increasingly centralized
in the federal government and away from state and municipal bodies. As
discussed in Part I, the 2009 reform (regarding petty-dealing) to the General
Health Law and the Federal and State criminal codes, redistributed drug
enforcement jurisdiction among the States and the Federation.290 The new
laws entrusted the prosecution of possession and small scale trafficking to
the states, while cases involving larger amounts or those deemed important
by the central government were to be prosecuted at the Federal level. 291
Although the reform exhibited a federalist drive, it actually allowed the
central government to determine state criminal policy regarding drugs.292 At
least one state—Campeche—tried to implement its own drug policy, but the
federal government quickly challenged the state law and obtained a ruling
from the Supreme Court stating that only the Federation has the ability to
determine which and how drug-related crimes can be punished.293 Because
drug policy has such severe consequences and must be carefully considered
with other regulations and public policy, the Mexican States should be
allowed leeway in deciding drug policy.
The disruption of local affairs sharply increased in 2006, when the
federal government decided to deploy federal troops to eradicate crops and
stop illicit trafficking.294 Today, there is military presence in most of Mexico,
with soldiers carrying out public security tasks and combating drug
trafficking organizations.295 The centralized model of security hinders key
components of public security, like citizen participation, self-governance,
and the possibility of adopting distinctive local security strategies.296 As the
war on drugs advanced, more attention was placed on military and other
national security institutions. This “reliance upon institutions designed to
conduct war, increases the power of the central government, undermining
federalism, while also expanding the power of the executive branch, altering
the relative strength of the different branches of government.”297
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Oliver Meza investigated how chronic violence and prohibition has
resulted in a contraction of Mexican municipalities’ governmental
capacities. 298 In particular, Meza noted a decrease of mechanisms and
institutions that seek popular participation and consultation.299 Although his
study is inconclusive as to the exact causes for this shift,300 he documents a
very significant effect: for each drug-violence-related death per 1,000
habitants, municipalities cancel approximately two mechanisms of popular
participation and consultation, and eliminate two institutions of popular
participation and engagement.301 Meza concludes that prohibitionist policies
have severely damaged the core capacities of the same State that has so
enthusiastically advanced them over the last years.302
The consequences of prohibition for the integrity of the constitutional
territorial division of powers, as developed in Article 73, is unmistakable.
Article 73, which lists the areas of jurisdiction of the Federation, has thirtyone sections, many of them further subdivided. These provisions regularly
cover topics and institutions addressed elsewhere in the Constitution,
creating repetition and inefficiencies. For example, Article 73 contains
provisions conferring the Federation jurisdiction over federal crimes
(Subsection 21); the National Guard and the use of force (Subsection 23);
the creation, structure, and functions of a Federal Tribunal of Administrative
Justice (Subsection 29-H); national security (Subsection 29-M); the emission
of a General Statute on electoral matters and political parties (Subsection 29U); the regime of administrative responsibility of all public servants
(Subsection 29-V); the rights of victims (Subsection 29-X); or the extinction
298
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of property rights (Subsection 30). This disharmonic expansion of federal
jurisdiction certainly contributes to the many problems that prohibitionist
drug policies have caused in the country.
Even the horizontal division of powers is being seriously impinged on,
as the Obrador Administration increasingly bypasses constitutional checks
and balances in reacting to failed drug policy. In March 2019, a
constitutional amendment was passed to create the National Guard, in
replacement of the Federal Police.303 Within the text of the amendment, the
Guard was explicitly defined as a civil body, governed by the Public Security
Secretary. A transitory regime was created to deal with the existing
militarization.304 This regime stated that for five years, and “as the National
Guard advances the process of developing its structure, capacities and
territorial deployment, the President may assign the Army to fulfill functions
of public security in an extraordinary, regulated, supervised, subordinated
and complementary manner.”305 Despite the passage of a statute regulating
the Guard in May 2019, on year later, the President issued an executive
decree invoking the transitory provision and providing that the army would
directly carry out many functions of the Guard (including, for instance, the
ordinary investigation of crimes). 306 This action was challenged as an
overreach of presidential authority by the President’s own party. 307 This
episode illustrates to what extent the core resorts of the constitutional
structure are now under stress in Mexico, for a variety of reasons that include
an unwillingness to recognize and stop repressive drug policies that are
deteriorating democratic institutions.
1.

Legality, due process, and the rule of law

Legally, prohibition has justified adoption of laws that restrict due
process rights, putting pressure on the administration of justice and creating
a framework of State action that increases arbitrariness and does not align
with the requirements of the rule of law.
In 2008, a special regime was adopted in Mexico to facilitate the
prosecution of organized crime, which at the time primarily revolved around
the illegal drug market.
303
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This exceptional regime restricts fundamental rights for anyone
suspected of certain crimes. It includes:
“(i) the possibility of authorities retaining people —
without communication or formal accusation— for up to eighty
days when ‘necessary for the advancement’ of a criminal
investigation involving organized crime [known as arraigo];
(ii) an extended detention period (four days, as opposed to two)
before a detainee has to be presented before a judge; (iii)
restrictions on communication of prisoners while detained or in
prison (excluding legal advice); (iv) serving out sentences in
“special” prisons, separate from the general population; (v) the
possibility of imposing “special,” non-specified surveillance
measures during prisoners’ sentences; and (vi) an exception to
the right to know who the accuser is.”308
The regime however, soon became permanent and more commonly
used, eluding the “exceptionality” quality. The use of measures like the
arraigo grew exponentially, while convictions for organized crime remained
the same, showing their limited use for drug policy purposes.309
Organized crime is constitutionally defined as “an organization of
three or more people, to commit crimes in a permanent or repeated way, in
terms of the applicable law”310 This open definition leaves to Congress the
ability to determine which criminal conduct falls under the exceptional
regime.311 The Federal Law includes thirty-six crimes that can fall into this
category, including include kidnaping, human trafficking, and drug crimes.
In recent years, however, efforts to curb organized crime have focused
primarily on prosecuting drug crimes under this special regime.312 While the
number of criminal investigations initiated for organized crime has
decreased in the country since 2012, criminal investigations for organized
crime related to drug crimes steadily rose from 2016 to 2019.313
As previously stated, the most punished drug crimes are possession
crimes, often simple possession without the intent to sell or distribute.314 The
use of criminal law to punish crimes of possession is not only
308
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disproportionate, but also activates mechanisms which reinforce and deepen
discretionary practices. The crime of possession does not require any
criminal investigation from police or prosecutors, as the mere fact of
possession is all the necessary proof. Many of these cases are initiated after
a “frisk and search.” In one study conducted in the State of San Luis Potosí
in Mexico, 100% of drug arrests cases studied were made in flagrancia,
meaning they occurred because a police saw a person with suspicious
characteristics on the street, and not as a result of an investigation.315 The
study shows how drug crimes, specifically possession, are often used as a
tool to facilitate police detentions and prosecutors’ need of evidence in
detriment of building institutional capacities.316 In the long run, the use of
drug crimes to sanction individuals who would otherwise would not be
punishable by law, encourages impunity and weakens the rule of law.
Furthermore, the particular way in which prohibition has been
enforced in Mexico, in a context of weak judicial and prosecutorial
institutions, has led to an increase in mistreatment and human rights
violations. A study by Ana Laura Magaloni, for example, shows how torture
and mistreatment grew substantially after 2006.317 According to her data,
drug arrests nearly doubled during the bulk of the Calderón Administration,
rising from 34% to 65%.318 And while the Federal Police were responsible
for 37% of all federal detentions, the army carried out 25% of them. 319
Magaloni analyzed the presence of torture and mistreatment in these cases,
organizing them by the seriousness of the mistreatment and the institution
involved, 320 and found that the seriousness of the mistreatment against
detainees increased significantly after 2006 (when the war on drugs was
launched), with a particular increase in reports associated with the
military.321 And the data shows an particular increase in the case of people
detained for drug crimes.322
Another study by the Johns Hopkins-Lancet Commission on Drug
Policy confirms the rise in mistreatment and torture in Mexico after 2006.323
According to that study, it was 1.57 times more probable to experience
315
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torture or abuse during detention for a drug crime after the onset of the war
on drugs than prior to December 2006.324
Illegal drug markets thrive in contexts of corruption 325 and
impunity,326 and Mexico is no stranger to these problems.327 Although the
relationship between drugs and corruption is difficult to determine—in part
due to the circular relationship between the two—some studies show how
drug markets facilitate this problem.328 The war on drugs preserves certain
authoritarian proclivities of the Mexican state, thus fostering corruption and
impunity, because the “elevation of the security agenda above other
functions and priorities of the government increase the power of the leasttransparent, least accountable portions of the regime.”329
Prohibitionist and repressive drug policies bolster authoritarian
retrogressions while weakening the preconditions for the State to preserve
the defining features of public action under the constrains of the rule of law.
CONCLUSION
Prohibitionist drug policies are the remnants of another time. They are
remnants of a time when we knew much less about the modalities and effects
of drug use and when the production, transportation, and distribution of
drugs involved very different channels and actors. They are from a time
when legal frameworks were not transformed by contemporary ideas
regarding constitutional normativity and the role of fundamental rights in
national and international law.
Prohibitionist drug policies, with extremely harsh punishments,
violate the Mexican Constitution. The Supreme Court has started to
dismantle some aspects of this regime, specifically in its decisions on the
personal use of cannabis. However, as important as these decisions are to
transforming the public debate on drugs, they are still a far cry from altering
the fundamental orientation of policy-making and social dynamics in the
policy area.
Prohibition is at odds with the Mexican Constitution and the human
rights treaties that are part of the Mexican Bill of Rights, even when
324
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considering the limitations of explicit constitutional restrictions or the
principle of proportionality. Current drug policy violates basic rights such as
health, equality, and the free development of personality. And Prohibition
seriously impairs the function of constitutional democracy for a much
broader set of considerations. Prohibition has compromised the most
structural aspects of democracy and the rule of law in Mexico.
Prohibitionist drug-policy may thus be characterized as a “systemic
constitutional underminer,” since it generates many interconnected
normative problems that penetrate all social domains. The rights and nonrights violations generated by current drug policies reinforce one another,
projecting an extraordinary amount of unconstitutional damage to the
functioning of the whole system. Prohibitionist drug policy violates
constitutional rights, prevents individuals from pursuing legitimate life
plans, permanently creates inequality, and generates severe and massive
damage to the life and health of individuals. Prohibition does not effectively
preserve legitimate health-related goals and disrupts the operation of the
Mexican state. Even if there were no conflicts between prohibition and the
Mexican Bill of Rights, regulation would still be necessary to prevent
violations of other constitutional provisions concerning market regulation,
federalism, and the collapse of State’s capabilities to meet its basic rule of
law responsibilities. Regulation of drug markets is a necessary policy
There is a modest bright side to this depressing situation: if Mexico is
interested in identifying strategic policies with an enhanced potential to
reverse current patterns of social, political, and legal disruption, drug policy
is the area to be prioritized. Due to its systemic presence, a reorientation of
drug policy would improve many things at once. A reoriented regulation,
one truly committed to the fulfillment of the rights to health, free
development of the personality and equality, would become a “systemic
constitutional reinforcer.” This would increase dignity, liberty, equality, and
well-being. Such a turn is not only wise, but also urgently necessary to honor
the fundamental mandates of the Mexican Constitution.

